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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has historically oscillated between periods of
isolationism and internationalism. Typically, periods of internationalism have
accompanied American engagement in wars and military alliances outside the
United States. Such military engagement has often involved the United States
acting ostensibly as part of an international coalition, and has been followed
frequently by economic engagement. The period since World War II has
featured both a continued military internationalism in the form of several
active military campaigns and protective pacts and a sustained U.S. interest
in increased international trade. This outward-looking tendency is illustrated
by the United States' strong interest in pursuing trade liberalization through
accords such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as well
as by its interest in international security organizations such as the United
Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since the Soviet
Union's collapse as a credible military threat, the focus of American
internationalism has shifted further to the economic arena. The past few years
have witnessed the United States accession to the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), the creation of the Asia Pacific Economic Forum
(APEC), and, in January 1995, the creation of the World Trade Organization
(WTO).
As the pace of U.S. involvement in international affairs quickens, so has
U.S. integration into international organizations. In the politico-military arena,
the United States has participated both theoretically and formally in a series
of multilateral military actions under the aegis of the United Nations. ' This
trend is noticeable also in the politico-economic arena. For example, under the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, decisions of bilateral trade
dispute panels are binding on both governments and are not subject to judicial
review on the merits.2 NAFTA established a similar dispute resolution
process.3 In addition, the WTO, which came into existence in January 1995,
enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over disputes under the GATT and may enforce
its decisions through sanctions.
While the United States has cooperated frequently with other states in its
forays in the international arena, these coalitions have in the past conformed
1. Recent examples of such actions include the operations in the Gulf War and Somalia.
2. The constitutionality of the bilateral panel itself is subject to review under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit. See discussion infra Parts IV.D.3, IV.E.
3. On the binding nature of NAFTA, see Demetrios G. Metrapoulos, Constitutional Dimensions of
the North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 141 (1994).
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to the traditional precepts of international public law: sovereign states acting
together voluntarily, theoretically not bound by group decisions, and free to
withdraw at any time. Unnoticed by the United States until recently, a new
internationalism is now gradually emerging, an internationalism characterized
by a marked trend towards supranationalism. Unlike international
organizations of old, which relied on member states to accept rules and
decisions voluntarily, the new international institutions are increasingly
supranational: "international judicial persons" whose decisions and rules can
be practically enforced.
Integration into international organizations increasingly means ceding
sovereign competences to these organizations. The benefits of U.S.
involvement in such organizations come only at the price of acceding to
multilateral decisionmaking structures whose decisions do not necessarily
reflect the short term preferences of Congress or the President and cannot be
reviewed by American courts on the merits.
Ceding sovereign competences 'to international organizations raises
constitutional questions that the U.S. judiciary is beginning to confront.4 For
example, what is "sovereignty" and may the United States cede it? If so,
under what circumstances? Must international organizations be held to the
standards of the U.S. Constitution, particularly with regard to fundamental
rights? What is the appropriate role of the U.S. judiciary in deciding these
questions?
Perhaps most important, one must consider what impact the cession of
sovereign competences has upon the existing procedural and substantive values
of American constitutionalism, particularly those concerning separation of
powers and federalism. Cession may have profound effects not only by
shifting competences away from the constitutional organs of the United States,
but also the existing constitutional structure. Shifting sovereignty is likely, for
example, to strengthen the executive branch at the expense of both the
legislative and judicial branches. Furthermore, it may threaten the traditional
role of Article I courts as guarantors of constitutional protections by
excluding certain classes of cases from their review.5
Ultimately, the judiciary is the final bulwark against fundamental
revisions of the Constitution outside the amendment process. The judiciary
ensures that separation of powers is protected and that no competences
necessary for the judiciary and legislature to perform their constitutional roles
are delegated. Given the gravity of constitutional issues raised by the new
supranationalism and the extent of the court's responsibility, the judiciary
may, therefore, have to reconsider long held doctrines such as deference to
foreign policymaking by the executive branch, and review cessions of
sovereign competences continually rather than subjecting them to a single
adjudication without subsequent reconsideration.
Defining the respective roles of the executive, legislative, and judicial
4. See, e.g., National Council for Indus. Defense, Inc. v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 794 (D.D.C.
1993) (involving jurisdiction over constitutional challenge to United States-Canada Free Trade Act).
5. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding Commerce Clause power does not
authorize Congress to order state governments to regulate).
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branches in this new environment would prove difficult even given a coherent
set of principles underlying American involvement in global affairs. It is next
to impossible in the present environment in which there are no such
principles. Basic constitutional values such as the distribution of foreign
affairs powers are hidden in a "zone of twilight" where judges scarcely dare
tread.6
The lack of clear articulation of the distribution of power in the area of
foreign affairs means that some constitutional values are already defined to
some extent extrajudicially; the judiciary has essentially abdicated its role as
constitutional interpreter to the other two branches in this area, in particular
to the executive. As the United States confronts cessions of sovereign
competences to supranational institutions, the definition of constitutional
values threatens to become an increasingly extrajudicial activity. Faced with
this prospect, it seems prudent for the judiciary to define more precisely the
limits on the delegation of sovereign competences to international
organizations. 7
In many respects, the distinction between "foreign" and "domestic"
affairs has become moot as problems are increasingly transnational in nature
and supranational institutions play a greater role. The judiciary should
acknowledge this change by reformulating its traditional deference to
executive branch foreign policymaking and considering the merits of cases
alleging cession of sovereign competences to international or supranational
bodies. These issues have already been addressed to a large extent by the
countries of the European Union. Germany in particular, given its strong
Constitutional Court, federal structure, and analogous separation of powers,
provides a useful example for the United States.
This Article addresses some of these critical issues. Part Id introduces the
basic elements of the new internationalism which involve the ongoing shift
from traditional international law to supranational law. It outlines some of the
threats the shift poses to a federal Constitution and establishes the relevance
of Germany as a predictive model for the United States.
Part I considers the constitutional law of German internationalism. This
part focuses on the constitutional treatment of German integration into the
6. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(discussing judicial deference to different forms of presidential authority).
7. The judiciary traditionally has occupied the central role in defining the limits of the Constitution
and should continue to do so as the U.S. delegates sovereign powers. See The Constitution is What the
Judges Say It Is, in CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, ADDRESSES AND PAPERS 139 (1908) (propounding
philosophy of judicial review); 4 LEONARD W. LEVY ET AL., ENCYLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTrrUTION 1628-35 (1986) (discussing Supreme Court's attempt to interpret language of Fourth
Amendment); Charles Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's
Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755, 760-61 (1963) (discussing court claims of substantive
interpretation authority); Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of
Constitutional 'Interpretation", 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 557-61 (1985) (discussing constitutional
validation through judicial decisions); Frederick Schaver, The Occasions of Constitutional Interpretation,
72 B.U. L. REV. 729 (1992).
8. See Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bredlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a People-Centered
Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1993); John W. Head, Supranational Law:
How the Move Toward Multilateral Solutions is Changing the Character of International Law, 42 KAN.
L. REV. 605, 621 (1994) (discussing breakdown of distinction between foreign and domestic law).
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European Community (EC) and the European Union (EU). 9 As Germany has
ceded sovereign powers, its Constitutional Court has been forced to consider
the minimal levels of collective, systemic rights and individual rights it is
willing to accept and how these limits may be enforced.
Part IV considers the constitutional law of American internationalism.
Part IV begins by showing how our current constitutional order inadvertently
increases the risks associated with ceding sovereign competences. In addition
to exploring some of the hypothetical challenges that our constitutional order
may face in the future, Part IV examines American experiences with recent
delegations of sovereign competences to international trade organizations with
supranational characteristics, such as NAFTA and the WTO.
Part V highlights some of the lessons from the German experience and
suggests some possible constitutional approaches for future judicial review.
This part discusses the important issues the judiciary must face. In particular,
the judiciary should prepare to consider the extent to which supranational or
international entities must conform to American constitutional principles
before the United States will cede or share sovereign competences. Most
discussions of these issues have focused on narrow questions. Given the pace
at which international organizations with supranational and coequal
competences are developing, however, it is time to address the larger
constitutional issues: Which constitutional values need to be protected and how
can they be protected? This Article provides some initial ideas for
approaching these issues.
II. THE NEW INTERNATIONALISM: SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND
THE CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Since World War II, much of international law has evolved into
supranational law. International law is'deferential to the absolute sovereignty
of nation-states, while supranational law is law promulgated by institutions
whose institutional decisions are binding and enforceable against nation-states.
Traditionally, international organizations were reliant on voluntarism for
enforcement of rules and decisions. In the international realm an affected
state had to agree to follow a rule or decision. Ignoring a decision could at
most only result in political repercussions. The new internationalism is marked
by the advent of supranational organizations. Sanctioned by the supranational
organization, enforcement occurs in one of three ways: through multilateral
member state action against an offending party; through action of one member
9. The term "European Community" refers to three Communities: the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), created and coming into effect under the eponymous treaty of 1951, TREATY
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY [ECSC TREATY]; the European Economic
Community (EEC), created under the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
[EEC TREATY] (commonly referred to as the Treaty of Rome); and the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom), created under the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMUNITY [EURATOM TREATY]. The term "European Union" refers to the entity created by the Treaty
on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty], which came into force
in 1993, subsuming the earlier Communities with some voting and institutional modifications and adding
foreign and security policy pillars. References to events before 1993 use the former term. References to
events after that date use the two terms interchangeably.
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state against another; or through the voluntarism characteristic of earlier
international organizations. The first two are the most important because they
transform the character of enforcement from predominantly voluntaristic and
political to predominantly mandatory and judicial.
The advent of supranational law, which I call the new internationalism,
challenges the traditional way in which nation-states create and are affected
by "international" law. At the same time that supranational institutions t0
have developed, there has been an increasing recognition that many
"domestic" problems can only be solved on the international level, including
such diverse issues as nuclear proliferation; pollution and other global
environmental issues; financial flows; refugees; transfers of technology; the
trade, labor, consumer, and tax consequences of globalized production
patterns; and criminal law problems including drug trafficking and gun
control. Because effective resolution of the legal issues that arise from these
activities can only occur at the international level, there is a growing body of
international law that seeks either to regulate the activities or to coordinate
national regulation efforts."
With the birth of supranationalism and the increasingly transnational
nature of legal problems, the very distinction between domestic and
international sources of law breaks down. International and domestic have
become so intertwined that it is now inaccurate to address law as
"international" or "domestic." While international law scholars have grasped
this development'2 and started to grapple with redefining the term
international law,' 3 scholars of national constitutional law have failed to
10. For the sake of simplicity, I juxtapose international organizations with supranational
organizations. Less simply, one can imagine a continuum with purely international organizations at one
end and purely supranational organizations at the other end. Clearly, while there are purely international
organizations, i.e., organizations whose decisions are unanimous and whose enforcement is entirely reliant
on voluntaristic accession to decisions by member states there are no purely supranational organizations
at the current time. Not even the European Union is completely independent of the will of its member
states in enforcing decisions. A more nuanced appreciation of supranationalism would require me to
differentiate between institutions I identify as supranational. Given space constraints, I have chosen to
embrace simplicity. "Supranational organization," as used here, simply describes an organization nearer
the supranational end of the continuum than the international end.
11. A detailed discussion of the growing body of international law is beyond the scope of this
Article. It suffices to mention that the U.S. is party to approximately one thousand treaties. See 2 IcoR
I. KAvAss, A GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES TREATIES IN FORCE (1992).
12. See, e.g., Ivo Duchacek, Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a ypology of New Actors in
International Relations, in FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1, 3 (Hans J. Michelmann &
Panayotis Soldatos eds., 1990). For discussions of supranationalism in the international law context, see,
for example, Germain's Transnat'l L. Res. (Transnat'l Juris Publications) 1-5 (1995); Wolfgang
Fikentscher, Third World Trade Partnership: SupranationalAuthority vs. National ExtraterritorialAntitrust
- A Plea for "Harmonized" Regionalism, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1489, 1489 (1984) (criticizing the Seabed
Authority as example of "supranational authority"); James D. Kurek, Supranational Regulation of
Transnational Corporations: The UNCTAD and CTC Efforts, 2 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 268,
269-70 (1981) (discussing "supranational framework to control TNC activities"); Paul H. Nitze, Foreword:
International Security in a New World, 81 GEO. L.J. 481, 488 (1993) (proposing greater involvement by
U.N., NATO, and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as "supranational institutions").
13. For two perspectives on the anachronistic nature of traditional international law, see generally
MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 228-33 (2d ed. 1993); Mark W. Janis,
International Law?, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 363, 371-72 (1991). See generally W. Michael Reisman,
Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866 (1990)
(arguing that international law now protects popular sovereignty). For a redefinition, see generally John
W. Head, Supranational Law: How the Move Toward Multilateral Solutions is Changing the Character
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address the implications for domestic law and legal structures. As international
law becomes supranational (i.e., directly binds nation-states), national courts
will have to address the structure of relationships between states and
international organizations. The following section explores the shift from
international law to supranational law.
A. Traditional Notions of International Law and Sovereign Competence4
• Prior to World War II, no institution existed that could legally bind
nation-states. Precepts of international law were "binding" only insofar as
they were willingly accepted by individual nation-states. Given that nation-
states could end such obligations at will, the obligations were not binding in
the true sense of the word. In order to be binding, an obligation must continue
in force, and be capable of enforcement, regardless of the will of the bound
party. Furthermore, all legal relations arising between a nation-state and its
citizens were defined as domestic law, outside of the scope of "international"
law.
The dominant view of international law from at least the eighteenth
century on was law as a set of voluntary rules found in treaties and derived
from custom.15 In the early twentieth century, the Permanent Court of
International Justice 6 expressed this view in the widely quoted Lotus
decision 7 when it wrote that "[i]nternational law governs relations between
independent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate
from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally
accepted as expressing principles of law . . . .
A later international court, the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
adopted the same view. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, 1' widely treated as an exhaustive list of sources of international
law, 20 reads:
The Court, whose fun'etion is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes
as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
of 'International" Law, 42 KAN. L. REv. 605 (1994) (arguing that multilateralization has transformed
international law).
14. This section relies heavily on Head, supra note 13.
15. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 24-27 (2d ed. 1986). "Since law was ultimately
dependent upon the will of the sovereign in national systems, it seemed to follow that international law
depended upon the will of the sovereign states." Id. at 27. For a comprehensive discussion of the
development of international law in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 126-237 (1947).
16. The Permanent Court was established after World War I. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 689-90 (2d ed. 1973).
17. S.S: "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
18. Id. at 18.
19. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38, para. 1, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 1976
U.N.Y.B. 1052, 1055, U.N. Sales No. E-78.I.1. The ICJ was established in 1945 as the judicial organ
of the United Nations. BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 689-90.
20. MICHAEL AKEHURsT, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (6th ed. 1987).
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d... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law?'
The Statute of the ICJ, then, has established as sources of international
law not only general principles "recognized" by nation-states, but also
voluntarily accepted international agreements, such as treaties. Moreover, in
accordance with this view of international law as voluntarist, the ICJ was not
endowed with any power to enforce its decisions.
By the mid-twentieth century, "international law" clearly meant a body
of rules voluntarily adopted by nation-states, susceptible to future abrogation.
Furthermore, these rules themselves supported the nation-state as sovereign,
thereby establishing the international legal context in which "sovereignty" had
to be understood. When international law scholars wrote that "except as
limited by international law or treaty, each state is master of its own
territory, " 2  they did not use the word "limited" as conventionally
understood. Volutarily accepted obligations, which can be rescinded at any
time, are not true limits. Sovereignty was understood to be a set of claims
individual nation-states made about their own power, claims "limited" only
by the existence of other nation-states making similar claims.' Accordingly,
international law consisted of the voluntary agreements between sovereigns.
This definition of international law is beginning to break down.
Increasingly, "international" law is supranational: it emanates from institutions
whose decisions have binding force on nation-states and who can enforce their
decisions. They are supranational rather than international because they are
superior to nation-states in matters coming under their jurisdiction.
B. The New Internationalism: The Development of Supranational
Organizations
Examples of early international organizations include the League of
Nations, the International Labor Organization, the International Telegraphic
Union, and the Universal Postal Union. These organizations, some of which
were founded as early as the mid-1800s,24 served as fora where sovereign
states could gather to discuss issues of transnational concern and to coordinate
group action. None of these organizations had the power to enforce their rules
and decisions because they were conceived of, and acted as, gatherings of
21. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38, para. 1 [hereinafter STATUTE OF
THE ICJ].
22. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (2d ed. 1979).
23. For an excellent discussion of the development of sovereignty as a concept and its role in
international law, see Head, supra note 13. For a survey and criticism of some of those theories of
sovereignty, see J.L. BRIERLY, THELAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF PEACE 7-16 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY,
AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 14-26 (1990); Reisman, supra
note 13.
24. The International Telegraph Union and the Universal Postal Union were founded in 1865 and
1874, respectively. See ALFONS NOLL, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION 177-83; LUDWIG
WEBER, POSTAL COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 238-42; 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PtBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1983); see also LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT (ratified
June 28, 1919); CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, 62 Stat. 3490 (1946)
[hereinafter CoNsT. OF THE ILO].
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sovereigns.as The twentieth century has witnessed the exponential growth of
contacts between people of different countries and between countries as
political and military entities. As contacts have increased in such diverse areas
as trade, security, and culture, so has the number of attendant international
problems. The increase in activities whose origins or effects transcend national
boundaries has led to greater interdependence as nation-states have sought to
create suitable instruments to regulate newly emerging international issues.
International organizations have become these instruments. The limitations and
failures of absolutely sovereign states in World Wars I and II allowed
international law to move toward supranational law, that is, toward a system
of laws that could pierce the veil of sovereignty and influence the internal
affairs of states.
After World War II, a group of important organizations emerged,
including the United Nations (U.N.), the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World
Bank), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These
institutions often had supranational characteristics, such as mechanisms to
enforce their decisions. The power of each organization to enforce its rules
and decisions was often more theoretical than practical, but the institutional
procedures did exist.26
In addition to specific enumerated powers, these organizations had more
general writs that endowed them with quasi-legislative functions and provided
bases for the development of new forms of international law that were
intended to be binding on states. The U.N., for example, was created to
maintain international peace and security. Although the U.N. Charter
mentions human rights only as a general idea, it at least recognizes that
international standards of human rights exist and it seeks to promote and
25. See, e.g., CONST. OF THE ILO arts. 19-20, 62 Stat. at 3518-33 (describing procedures for
adopting conventions); id. arts. 24-25, 62 Stat. at 3534-37 (describing procedures invoked if conventions
not followed); id. arts. 26-34, 62 Stat. at 3536-44 (describing how members can react when other members
fail to follow conventions).
26. For example, the U.N., founded in 1945, could require members to obey the decisions of the
Security Council. See U.N. CHARTER art. 25. The IMF was created to regulate the international monetary
order through the stabilization of convertible exchange rates; RICHARD W. EDWARDS, JR., INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY COLLABORATION 491-92 (1985) (noting original IMF requirement of convertibility at set par
value in terms of gold or U.S. dollars and restriction on changing par values). A subsequent amendment
to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF altered this requirement to allow floating rates. 1 MARGARET
GARRITsEN DE VRIES, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1972-1978, at 3-4 (1985); see also Second
Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T.
2203 (entered into force Apr. 1, 1978). The IMF can condition the use of its funds, normally provided
as structural adjustment loans, on fulfillment of its own requirements and can restrict later grants of funds
if states have failed to satisfy earlier requirements. The World Bank was created to supplement private
capital markets by providing funds to war-torn European governments for reconstruction and by providing
funds to developing countries. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Dec. 27, 1945, art. I, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter World Bank Articles of
Agreement]. But see EDWARD S. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETTON
WOODS 150 (1973) (noting that World Bank did not play major development role during its early stages).
Since its foundation, the World Bank has had powers of enforcement similar to those of its sister
institution, the IMF. See World Bank Articles of Agreement, supra, art. I, 60 Stat. at 1440, 2 U.N.T.S.
at 134.
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encourage respect for them.27 The recognition of binding standards of human
rights fostered the development of human rights law and the supervision of
those rights by international and supranational organizations.2" During their
nascence, the new areas of international law were not supranational because
there were no adequate enforcement mechanisms. Yet even such areas as the
regulation and prosecution of war crimes have gradually developed
supranational characteristics as the end of the Cold War has allowed the
Security Council to take a more active role.
The institutional structures of the U.N., IMF, and World Bank opened the
door to supranational law. The lack of supranational power distinguished the
GATT from its sister institutions and marked a limit on states' grant of
supranational competences to international bodies. The transition from the
GATT to the WTO quickened the transition of international trade to
supranational structures. The transformation occurred in three stages, with
different institutions involved at each stage. First, the less developed countries
acceded to supranationalism. Second, the European industrialized countries
adopted a supranational economic framework. Finally, the United States,
without much conscious consideration, began not only to recognize
supranational power through its participation in supranational security
enforcement, but also to cede competences to supranational trade institutions.
1. Developing Countries: The Supranational Institutions of Bretton
Woods
The IMF and the World Bank quickly came to play an important role in
stabilizing and developing the economies of less developed countries
(LDCs).' 9 As their importance grew, these supranational institutions began
to exercise the power over states with which they had been legally
endowed.3° Developing countries became increasingly dependent on the
Bretton Woods institutions as sources of capital, allowing the institutions to
play an important role in internal policymaking by conditioning financing on
the acceptance of domestic policy prescriptions. By the mid-1980s, LDCs had
ceded sovereign competences over exchange rate policy, monetary policy, and
fiscal policy to both institutions so often that the IMF and the World Bank had
secured a supranational role in these areas with respect to developing
countries.
On a general level, states that joined the IMF agreed to cede some control
over monetary policy and exchange rates by agreeing to be bound by the rules
27. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 3; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c) ("IT]he United Nations shall
promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.").
28. For supervisory mechanisms in the area of human rights, see FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID
WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 3-17 (1990); Shigeru Oda, The Individual in International
Law, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 469, 498-503 (Max Sorensen ed., 1968).
29. The IMF and the World Bank were created at a conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire
and are often referred to as the Bretton Woods institutions. See MASON & ASHER, supra note 26, at 21-28.
30. See Head, supra note 13, at 627; KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GAME: REFORM AND
EVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 88-101 (1982); A.W. HOOKE, THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 18-19 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 37, 1982).
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specified at Bretton Woods and subsequently by the IMF.31 A procedure was
created for regular meetings with states to allow the IMF to coordinate
policies and to ensure that individual states complied with IMF rules. 2 In
particular, the IMF could condition financing of balance of payments crises
on a state's fulfillment of IMF-imposed obligations. 3 The original IMF
charter required member states to establish a par value in gold or U.S.
dollars. Currencies could float only within narrow bands from the established
par value, and changes to par values had to be approved by the IMF.3 4 To
persuade states to cede some sovereign competences over monetary policy, the
IMF created incentives such as a more reliable international payments
system,35 financing for member states experiencing balance of payments
problems, and membership in the World Bank.36
The role of the IMF has changed over time. With the transition to floating
exchange rates,37 the IMF began to function as an overseer of the
international monetary system. During the international debt crisis of the early
1980s,3" the IMF cemented its role as a supranational body regulating the
internal fiscal and monetary policies of developing countries by conditioning
access to IMF funds on compliance with IMF policy demands. 9
Similarly, by providing financing in the form of loans, the World Bank
played an important role in stabilizing and developing the economies of
LDCs. Like the IMF, the World Bank conditions its structural adjustment
3 1. See generally GARRITsEN DE VRIES, supra note 26; Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund, supra note 26, art. IV (limiting members' exchange rate policies); see also id. art. VII
(prohibiting restrictions on current payments and discriminatory currency practices and requiring freely
convertible currencies); id. art. V (limiting use of IMF's general resources); see also DAM, supra note
30, at 88-101; HOOKE, supra note 30, at 18-19.
32. EDWARDS, supra note 26, at 604-07; 2 JOSEPH GOLD, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 515, 527-30 (1984).
33. EDWARDS, supra note 26, at 638-42. When the IMF was not providing finance, it had to rely
on other member states to pressure prodigal members. GOLD, supra note 32, at 520, 527-30.
34. HOOKE, supra note 30, at 2-3.
35. See DAVID D. DRIscoLL, INT'L MONETARY FuND, WHAT IS THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND? 3-5 (1988); see also MARGARET GARRITSEN DE VRIES, THE IMF IN A CHANGING WORLD:
1945-85, at 6-7 (1986); EDWARDS, supra note 26, at 4-8.
36. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, supra note
26, art. II, § 1(a). Membership is required in order to receive World Bank financing. The World Bank
Articles'of Agreement require that a member state be either guarantor or borrower on all loan agreements.
World Bank Articles of Agreement, art. III, § 4; see also INTERNATIONAL BORROWING 47-87 (Daniel D.
Bradlow ed., 1986) (providing sample loan agreement and general conditions applicable to development
credit agreements). The World Bank is an important source of development aid.
37. On the transition from the par value-based system to floating exchange rates, see EDWARDS,
supra note 26, at 491-501; GARRITSEN DE VRIES, supra note 26, at 3-4 (noting legalization of floating
rates through Second Amendment of IMF Charter).
38. For a description of the debt crisis, see, e.g., GARRITSEN DE VRIES, supra note 26, at 182-86;
Bahrain Nowzad, Lessons of the Debt Decade, FIN. & DEV., Mar. 1990, at 9, 9-12.
39. For a description of how the IMF came to play a preeminent role in providing finance to
developing countries during this period and began to exercise supranational power, see John W. Head,
Environmental Conditionality in the Operations of International Development Finance Institutions, 1 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 15 (1991) (discussing use of performance criteria and conditionality); John W. Head,
Suspension of Debtor Countries' Voting Rights in the IMF: An Assessment of the Third Amendment to the
IMF Charter, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 591, 594 n.5, 599-600 (1993) (discussing how IMF financing approval
affects later access to private capital markets).
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loans on the satisfaction of certain monetary and fiscal policy criteria.4" Not
only must these criteria be satisfied prior to the grant of a loan, but the
policies must also be maintained after the loan has been granted. The World
Bank attempts to ensure continuing compliance with its policy demands by
incorporating detailed covenants, including reporting requirements, into its
loans to developing countries.4 In addition, even when it is not practical to
enforce these requirements for existing loans, the Bank may condition future
loans on past performance.42
Due to their dependence on the IMF and the World Bank, developing
countries regularly have been obliged to cede traditional sovereign
competences over exchange rate policy, monetary policy, and fiscal policy,
thereby allowing the two institutions to become supranational. The delegation
of authority over economic policy by developing countries therefore
constituted the first stage of the development of supranational institutions.
2. The European Union as a Supranational Economic and Judicial
Structure
While many developing countries have little choice but to cede sovereign
competences to the IMF and World Bank, industrialized countries and major
military powers have more leverage vis-t-vis international and supranational
organizations. In addressing transnational legal problems or in fostering
greater interdependence, industrialized countries must be willing to cede
sovereign competences. The European Union marks perhaps the most
ambitious effort of this sort.43 Since its inception, many Western European
countries have opted to join the European Union. Currently, the EU can be
characterized as a legal regime of supranational character. Policymaking in
certain economic areas, such as external tariffs, is reserved to the EU and its
principle legislative and executive bodies - the European Commission and the
Council of Ministers. The Treaty of Rome and its successor, the Treaty of
European Union (Maastricht Treaty), compose the EU "constitution" and
impose certain obligations on the member states. These obligations are
enforced by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the judicial arm of the EU.
The ECJ plays a prominent role in interpreting and enforcing the treaties. All
member states accept that the laws of the EU, whether treaty provisions, ECJ
opinions interpreting them, regulations, or directives, are supreme and trump
any conflicting national legal provisions. The supremacy of the laws of the
EU over those of member states approximates the supremacy of federal law
40. See, e.g., 1993 WORLD BANK ANNUAL REP. 14-15; see also IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE
WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 25-27, 58-59 (1991).
41. See INTERNATIONAL BORROWiNG, supra note 36, at 47-87 (providing sample loan agreement and
general conditions applicable to development credit agreements).
42. Id.
43. Jochen Frowein, The European Community and the Requirement of a Republican Form of
Government, 82 MIcH. L. REV. 1311 (1984) (discussing whether EU is democratic). Even in the 1960s,
the EC was considered supranational. See Nina Heathcote, The Crisis of European Supranationality, 5 J.
COMMON MKT. STuD. 140 (1966) (describing difficulties of EC's being supranational).
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over state law in the U.S. constitutional order.'
Just as the current development of supranationalism in the United States
is driven by the desire to encourage trade, the European Union evolved from
trade-related concerns. The current Union is rooted in the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC), established in 19514' both for the economic
purpose of regulating the coal and steel markets and for the political purpose
of fostering interdependence between Germany and France in the aftermath
of World War II. The Treaty of Rome, the backbone of the constitutional
order of the European Union, was ratified in 1957 and broadened the reach
of the original ECSC Treaty by creating the European Economic Community
(EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The Treaty
of Rome created an economic community' committed to eliminating trade
barriers and achieving a common market and customs union among the
member states. The Treaty of Rome has been amended several times,
resulting in the increase of the power of the institutions created by the treaty.
In 1965, the Merger Treaty47 amended the Treaty of Rome to create a
unified Council of Ministers and European Commission to oversee what had
been three separately managed Communities,. namely the ECSC, EEC, and
Euratom. More recently, the Single European Act (SEA) of 19864s
established 1992 as the deadline for realizing a single market by listing areas
where Treaty of Rome goals had not been achieved and by modifying the
voting structure of the Council of Ministers to allow qualified majority
voting.49 Finally, the Maastricht Treaty 0 moved the Union further toward
majority voting, enhanced the institutional role of the European Parliament,
and explicitly made political union a goal to be achieved through the addition
of EU-level competences in foreign and security policy on the one hand and
justice and interior on the other.-"
44. Antonio La Pergola & Patrick Del Duca, Community Law, International Law and the Italian
Constitution, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 598 (1985) (discussing EC supremacy in Italy); Eric Stein, Lawyers,
Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 10-16 (1981). For ECJ
cases see Case 6164, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585 (first case on supremacy); Case 106/77,
Amministrazione delleFinanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, S.P.A., 1978 E.C.R. 629 (holding that ordinary
member state courts must apply supremacy clause).
45. ECSC TREATY.
46. This was not necessarily the entire goal, though. The foreign ministers of the ECSC, when
considering the formulation of the Treaty of Rome, hoped to achieve the beginning of a political union,
too. See D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INsTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNmIES 12 (D.
Lasok & K.P.E. Lasok eds., 1994).
47. Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities,
Apr. 8, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 776 (amending EEC TREATY).
48. Single European Act, Feb. 17 & 28, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 503 [hereinafter SEA].
49. For literature on 1992, see Selected Bibliography on Europe 1992, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 571
(1990).
50. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247.
51. The three legally distinct Communities (ECSC, EEC, and Euratom) became subsets of the
European Union through the Maastricht Treaty. Article A of the treaty provides: "By this Treaty, the High
Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European Union, hereafter called 'The Union.'"
Maastricht Treaty art. A, 31 I.L.M. at 255. These three Communities constitute one of the three pillars
of the EU; the other two are the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Co-operation in Justice and
Home Affairs. The Maastricht Treaty establishes mechanisms to realize the latter two pillars. See ANDREW
CHARLESWORTH & HOLLY CULLEN, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 8-10 (1994) (explaining legal
implications of Union atop three Communities and definining terms).
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The institutional infrastructure that developed under these broad legal
initiatives functions, in many respects, as a supranational entity resting atop
the individual member states of the European Union. This entity makes
binding laws and has a judiciary to interpret them. The European
Commission, theoretically the executive arm of the EU, proposes laws. The
Council of Ministers, made up of ministerial representatives from the
governments of the member states, legislates. The European Parliament,
originally a powerless body, assumed co-legislative power under the
Maastricht Treaty. The EU has three main legislative procedures that result
in law binding on member states: regulation, directive, and decision.
Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome defines these procedures as follows:
In order to carry out their task the Council and the Commission shall [in accordance
with the provisions of this treaty] make regulations, issue directives, take decisions, make
recommendations or deliver opinions.
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and
directly applicable in all Member States.
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State
to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and
methods.
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force. 2
As is clear from the language used in article 189, regulations, directives, and
decisions are not merely hortatory but are intended (and used) to create law
binding on member states. Upon passage, regulations are automatically
incorporated into the legal regimes of the individual member states and are
immediately binding. Directives, on the other hand, must be incorporated into
national law by an implementing statute. While individuals may rely upon
regulations as a basis for legal actions upon passage, directives confer
justiciable rights only if they have "direct effect." Direct effect, a judicial
doctrine developed by the ECJ, allows individuals to rely upon a directive that
is unconditional and sufficiently precise if member states are required to
incorporate the directive in question by a set date and that date has passed. If
these conditions are met, the individual may invoke the directive as a binding
source of law in a domestic law court of a member state.53 An individual
may even be entitled to damages if the individual is prevented by national law
from following the requirements of a nonimplemented directive because the
directive conflicts with a provision of national law.54 The supranational
character of the EU is evident in that it can override existing legislation of
member states. This authority to override the laws of member states is
analogous to that of the federal government of the United States with regard
52. EEC TREATY.
53. For a more detailed discussion of direct effect, see, e.g., Pierre Pescatore, The Doctrine of
"Direct Effect" An Infant Disease of Comnunity Law, 8 EUR. L. REV. 155 (1983); see also Case 8/81,
Becker v. Finanzamt Moinster-Innenstadt, 1982 E.C.R. 53; Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974
E.C.R. 1337; Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. 1629.
54. Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357.
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to preexisting state laws.55
Indeed, the supranational character of the EU is widely acknowledged and
much recent debate has been dominated by discussion of the principle of
"subsidiarity." "Subsidiarity" is similar to the American constitutional
principle of federalism.16 The discussion of subsidiarity takes place, much
as in the United States, as part of a broader constitutional discourse. The EU
is so well established as a supranational entity that the foundational treaties
have taken on the character of a constitution. In fact, the ECJ refers explicitly
to the Treaty of Rome (and its successor, the Maastricht Treaty) as "the basic
constitutional charter" of the EU.57 The ECJ has held that the legitimacy of
the EU's supranational power lies in the voluntary decisions of the member
states to transfer sovereign competences. 5s Even the British have accepted
fundamental alterations of their constitutional order, such as the end of
parliamentary sovereignty (the doctrine by which the parliament alone could
overturn its own statutes)."
With doctrines such as direct effect and supremacy anchored in its
"constitutional" order, although it is not a state in any conventional sense the
European Union has become an international organization with supranational
power.6°
55. A detailed discussion of preemption under EU law is beyond the scope of this Article. For
further discussion, see generally Case 237/82, Jongeneel Kaas B.V. v. Netherlands, 1984 E.C.R. 483;
Stephen Weatherill, Beyond Pre-emption? Shared Competence and Constitutional Change in the European
Community, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 14, 16 (David O'Keeffe & Patrick M.
Twomey eds., 1994).
56. For detailed discussions of subsidiarity, see Commission Report to the European Council on the
Adaptation of Community Legislation to the Subsidiarity Principle, COM(93) 545 final. In its Edinburgh
Summit meeting in December 1992, the European Council addressed the importance of subsidiarity. See
European Council in Edinburgh, Conclusions of the Presidency, Bull. EC 12-1992, annex to part A, at
11-12; George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and
the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 334 (1994); Nicholas Emiliou, Subsidiarity: Panacea or Fig
Lea]?, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 55; Josephine Steiner, Subsidiarity
Under the Maastricht Treaty, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 55; A.G. Toth,
A LegalAnalysis of Subsidiarity, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 55; Deborah
Z. Cass, The Word that Saves Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers Within
the European Community, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1107 (1992); A.G. Toth, The Principle of
Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1079 (1992).
57. Case 294/83, Parti ecologiste 'Les Verts' v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, 1365. For
further discussion of the constitutionalism of the EU, see, e.g., Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the
Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 205 (1990); G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a
Constitution for Europe, 26 COMMoN MKT. L. REV. 595 (1989).
58. See, e.g., Case 26162, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963
E.C.R. 1; see also Robert O. Keohane & Stanley Hoffman, Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s,
in THE NEW EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1, 13 (Robert 0. Keohane & Stanley Hoffman eds., 1991)
(interpreting nature of EU's supranational power).
59.. When a statute passed by the British parliament conflicts with a directive or regulation of the EU,
it is void. The supremacy of EU law was accepted as mooting parliamentary sovereignty in a case
involving Spanish fishermen in British waters.
60. For a good discussion of the supranational character of the EU, see J.H.H. Weiler, The
Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2413-22 (1991).
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3. Accession of the United States to Supranational Institutions
The United States has been reluctant to cede sovereign competences to
supranational institutions. However, the United States has participated in
international security actions under the official auspices, and hence
jurisdiction, of supranational organizations. Furthermore, United States
participation in supranational peacekeeping efforts has increased dramatically
since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the character of U.S. participation
in supranational structures has recently undergone a sea change. The United
States not only voluntarily participates in actions on the part of supranational
bodies such as the U.N., but the United States has also ceded sovereign
competences over certain areas of international trade to bodies such as the
WTO and NAFTA. This .marks a profound shift in the definition of the United
States' statehood for which it is not constitutionally prepared.
a. The United States and the United Nations
Given the United States' prominent role in World War II and the
notorious failure of the United States to join the League of Nations, it was
clear in the mid-1940s that a successful international organization would
require U.S. participation. Ultimately, the United States did participate, and
the San Francisco Conference of 1945 resulted in the creation of the United
Nations.
The U.N. Charter marked a major change in international politics. Unlike
membership in the League of Nations," membership in the United Nations
required states (at least theoretically) to renounce the right to use force, except
in self-defense. 2 This crucial prerogative of sovereignty shifted, on paper,
to the Security Council, which chapter VII of the U.N. Charter endows with
the power to engage in collective security actions including "such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security."63
As a practical matter, however, the Security Council had little chance to
exercise its supranational potential during the Cold War. The Security Council
did act once during the Cold War period when it exercised its chapter VII
61. The Covenant of the League of Nations mandated only a three-month "cooling-off period" before
a declaration of war, with no enforcement mechanisms. See SHAw, supra note 15, at 542; see also
AKEHURsT, supra note 20, at 219; GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 584 (5th ed. 1986).
For accounts of attempts made both before and after the formation of the League of Nations to restrict the
legal right of a state to use force, see AKEHURST, supra note 20, at 216-19; SHAW, supra note 15, at
539-43; VON GLAHN, supra, at 583-88; Edward Gordon, Article 2(4) in Historical Concept, 10 YALE J.
INT'L L. 271 (1985).
62. "All Members [of the United Nations] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. .. ." U.N. CHARTER
art. 2, 4. A member facing "an armed attack" has the right to respond. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
63. U.N. CHARTER art. 42. Under chapter VII, the Security Council may also make
recommendations to restore international peace, call on members to adopt policies not involving armed
force, and make arrangements with member states for the supply of armed forces to the Security Council.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41, 43. Article 24(1) endows the Security Council with "primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security," U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 1, which power the
Security Council exercises on behalf of the members.
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powers in the case of the Korean War." However, by and large, force was
used repeatedly by member states without Security Council intervention.65
With the end of the Cold War, the Security Council finally was ready to
play an important role as a supranational guarantor of international security.
Its first test came with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. On November 29, 1990,
the Security Council adopted resolution 678, which called on member states
to "use all necessary means" to restore peace to the Persian Gulf. 66 An
international force led by the United States, acting under the authority of the
Security Council, forced the Iraqis out of Kuwait. The Security Council later
applied sanctions against Iraq.67
In more recent U.N.-sponsored actions in Somalia and Bosnia, the United
States has also played a prominent role. Abstractly, one could argue that the
United States acted on behalf of the United Nations and that the legitimacy of
such actions derives from this sponsorship. More pragmatically, however, one
must recognize that the unanimity rule within the Security Council assures that
Security Council actions can take place only with U.S. approval, and hence,
only in accord with U.S. policy goals. However, for countries such as Iraq
and Somalia, which possess no vote in the Security Council, the U.N. has
become a potent supranational security apparatus.
Like the United Nations, post-World War II international judicial
tribunals have had very limited success in acting supranationally. The
International Court of Justice has no enforcement mechanism, and the United
States is famous for ignoring adverse ICJ decisions.6" Indeed, in 1984, the
United States expressly stated that it would not submit to ICJ jurisdiction
concerning disputes arising from events in Central America69 and later
declared that it would not submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ at
64. SHAW, supra note 15, at 561. Shaw takes the view that the forces deployed in Korea did not
amount to U.N. forces in the sense envisioned under the Charter. Id. at561-62; see also AKEmSWT, supra
note 20, at 223-24; VON GLAHN, supra note 61. Some commentators analyze the Security Council's
actions in Korea as falling under article 39 of the Charter. See, e.g., JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE 32 (1982). Others consider those actions as
falling under both article 39 and article 42. See, e.g., 2 ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING 1946-1967, at 177 (1970).
65. See Thomas M. Franck, Who KilledArticle2(4)?, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 809, 836-37 (1970);
Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death ofArticle 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 544
(1971); W. Michael Reisman, Article 2(4): The Use of Force in Contemporary International Law, 78 AM.
SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 74, 77-78 (1984).
66. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., at 27, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990),
reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1565.
67. On the legality of the U.N.-sponsored action against Iraq, see generally JOHN N. MOORE, CRISIS
IN THE GULF: ENFORCING THE RULE OF LAW (1992); Eugene V. Rostow, Until What? EnforcementAction
or Collective Self-Defense?, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 506 (1991); Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the
Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452 (1991); Burns H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and
Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1991). However, like the
earlier Korean conflict, thejustification for U.N. actions under the Charter were not clear. See Schachter,
supra, at 459.
68. See Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 85 COLuM. L. REV.
1445 (1989); Thomas J. Pax, Comment, Nicaragua v. United States in the International Court of Justice:
Compulsory Jurisdiction or Just Compulsion?, 8 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 471 (1985).
69. Letter from Secretary of State George Schultz to the Secretary General of the United Nations
(Apr. 6, 1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 670 (1984).
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all.70
Yet, with the advent of supranational judicial bodies, the United States
can no longer ignore international judicial decisions. The United States has
been forced to give up domestic judicial review of the merits of decisions
from international tribunals as an important part of ceding sovereign
competences.
b. The United States and International Trade
Traditionally, the United States has been reluctant to cede sovereign
competences to international organizations, partly because of the nature of
international organizations and partly because of American refusal to be bound
by the decisions of international organizations. Since the end of World War
II, however, the United States has increased its international ties.
The GATT was originally intended as an agreement on tariff negotiations.
The International Trade Organization (ITO) was to enforce the obligations
arising under the GATT. 7' The ITO was intended to regulate trade between
member states in much the same way the IMF was to regulate the
international financial system.72 The Havana Charter framework for the ITO
was submitted to Congress for approval several times but was never ratified.
In December 1950, the President withdrew the ITO from consideration. The
GATT, which came to be the primary vehicle of international law for
regulating international trade, was much narrower in scope than the proposed
ITO because it was restricted to trade in goods.'
More recently, through participation in such organizations as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United States has
entered the arena of supranational power. By joining these organizations and
acceding to their rulemakiing and enforcement powers, the United States
increasingly has ceded sovereign competences over multilateral trade to
supranational organizations. The extensive U.S. involvement in these trade
organizations provides a useful field of analysis of American constitutional
70. These actions arose from a dispute between the United States and Nicaragua in which Nicaragua
alleged that the United States had mined Nicaraguan harbors. The ICJ asserted jurisdiction by an
overwhelming majority, see Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov.
26) (Judgment on Jurisdiction and Admissibility), and most U.S. commentators decried the American
refusal to submit to jurisdiction, see, e.g., Scorning the World Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1985, at E22
(criticizing U.S. refusal to submit to ICJ jurisdiction); Carlos Andres Perez's Solution, WASH. POST, Jan.
22, 1985, at A18 (same). The United States refused to comply with the ICJ's verdict in favor of
Nicaragua. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 169 (May 10)
(Provisional Measures), Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 215 (Oct. 4)
(Declaration of Intervention).
71. See HAVANA CHARTER FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION, Mar. 24, 1948,
reprinted in CLAIR WiLcox, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 231-327 (1949); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD
TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969).
72. See generally KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT 10-12 (1970); JACKSON, supra note 71, at 2-3,
9-10, 35-52; 1 GREGORY LETTERMAN, LETTERMAN'S LAW OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 180
(1990).
73. See HAVANA CHARTER, supra note 71, art. 12 (extending ITO coverage to foreign investment),
art. 53 (extending ITO regulation to trade in services).
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law and cession of sovereign competences. 74
4. The Challenge of Supranationalism for Federal Constitutions
Integration into supranational institutions challenges federal constitutional
orders in three broad areas: separation of powers, federalism, and due process
requirements. In the area of separation of powers, there are three main
concerns. The first concern involves the definition and control of the
distribution of powers between supranational orgaiizations and branches of the
federal state. The second concern is the extent to which delegation of
sovereign competences alters the distribution of powers among the main
federal branches. The last concern is the extent to which delegation of
sovereign competences alters the distribution of powers between the federation
and the constituent states. The second category, alteration of the distribution
of powers within the federal structure, can be broken down further into two
threats: the threat that the executive will be strengthened at the expense of the
other two branches and the threat that the executive and legislative branches
will be strengthened at the expense of the judiciary.
Federalist concerns are basically subsumed within the above framework,
although one can also envision powers reserved to the member states within
a domestic framework being transferred to a supranational organization as an
additional concern. Due process concerns are also linked to separation of
powers, since they are intimately associated With the quality and placement of
the judicial process to which citizens have access. In terms of quality, the
jurisprudence, laws, and legal structure of a supranational organization may
all inadequately safeguard due process. In terms of placement, the limited
access of citizens to national courts that occurs when a supranational
organization has its own independent judiciary may violate due process
requirements.
The experience of Germany, a federal state that has undergone profound
constitutional challenges to sovereignty through its integration into the
European Union, provides a benchmark against which the constitutional
challenges facing the United States as it integrates into supranational
organizations may be measured. The German Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, or BVG) has directly addressed many of the issues
described above. The BVG has particularly emphasized the preservation of
existing separation of powers. The Court has- held that any delegation of
powers to the European Union, for instance, must take place through a statute
of the German Bundestag (basic house of parliament),' approved by the
Bundesrat (representatives of state governments),76 which details the
74. Part V explores in greater detail the growing involvement of the United States in these three
supranational trade organizations - NAFTA, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, and the WTO -
and the particular constitutional implications raised by each case.
75. The Bundestag is- the lower house of the German parliament, equivalent to the House of
Representatives. See GRuNIGEsETZ, arts. 38-48.
76. The Bundesrat is the upper house of the German parliament, equivalent to the early Senate.
Ministers of state governments sit as representatives of the state governments. See GRUNDGESETZ, arts.
50-53, 77.
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competences being delegated,' as required by the Treaty Power of article
23 of the Grundgesetz. At the same time, the BVG has not been entirely
successful in preventing a redistribution of power from the legislative to the
executive branch.78 The BVG has faced similar challenges concerning the
redistribution of power from the states to the EU and has been even less
successful at preserving state power as integration into the supranational EU
proceeds.79
The jurisprudence of the BVG also reveals the strains on the judiciary as
competences are shifted to a supranational organization. One dominant strain
of the BVG's jurisprudence on delegating sovereign competences has been the
assertion that the BVG alone has the competence to define exactly which
powers have been delegated to the EU. 0 This position exists in tension with
the position of the European Court of Justice, which has exclusive jurisdiction
to interpret the constitutive treaties of the EU.81 As a practical matter, while
the BVG has rattled its saber, it has never held that a competence claimed by
the EU was not delegated by Germany. While this does not necessarily imply
abdication of the role it claims as definer of delegated powers, it does cast
some doubt upon the claims of the BVG in the area. Consequently, if open
conflict ever arose, it is unclear that the BVG would win.
The BVG is also concerned with due process. As the primary arbiter on
questions of EU law, the Court must consider both the quality of EU due
process protections and 'the appropriateness of the EU judiciary. Here, too,
the Court treads a line fraught with political hazards while addressing the
issues related to the distribution of judicial powers. Accordingly the scope of
delegated powers is difficult to determine. While the BVG has reserved the
right to scrutinize the EU judiciary's protection of German constitutional
rights, the BVG has never directly challenged an ECJ decision.
5. Potential Constitutional Strategies for the United States
If there is one lesson to take away from the German experience, it is that
the judiciary must play an active role in policing delegations of sovereign
competences to supranational organizations. The judiciary is uniquely
positioned within the constitutional order to monitor the constitutional
repercussions of policies originating in the executive and/or legislative
branches. In fact, the preservation of the structure of government mandated
by the U.S. Constitution is one of the central roles of the judicial branch.
While the executive and legislative branches must ultimately decide whether
to delegate competences, it is for the judiciary to decide the constitutionality
of this delegation, although the courts are placed in the awkward role of
examining the distribution and strength of judicial power. The judiciary has
performed such an examination in the past when it evaluated the
77. See infra Part III (discussing Solange, Solange 11, and Maastricht decisions of BVG).
78. See infra Part III (discussing Maastricht decision).
79. See infra Part III (discussing Bayerische Staatsreierung case).
80. See infra Part III (discussing Maastricht decision).
81. See infra Part III (discussing Maastricht decision of BVG and van Gend en Loos decision of
EC).
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constitutionality of Article I courts. In the present case, policy dictates even
more sternly that the judiciary step in, since one of the fundamental threats of
delegating sovereign competences has been, and will continue to be, that
persons will lose recourse to Article III courts on the merits of a case.
Judicial activism in this area conflicts with a tradition of judicial
deference to the executive branch. While there is much to be said for
deference, it is extremely dangerous when cession of sovereign competences
is under consideration because there is- a strong likelihood of a weakened
judiciary and a strengthened executive. Deferring to executive decisions in this
area only reinforces the strengthening of the executive and the weakening of
the judiciary when sovereign competences are ceded. Given the profound
effects on the constitutional order, it is inappropiate for the judiciary to defer
to executive decisions regarding cession of sovereign competences on the
grounds that it is within the foreign affairs power of the President. The
judiciary should reconsider application of the political question doctrine in
regard to the cession of sovereign competences.
One simple way for the judiciary to rein in the broadening of executive
power is to reconsider the treaty power and how it relates to executive
agreements. When sovereign competences are ceded, an executive agreement
cannot be procedurally sufficient as a constitutional matter. If the judiciary
disagrees, it must offer an explicit rationale.
The lack of explicit (or even implicit) consideration of many of these
issues by the judiciary is perhaps the greatest problem. For example, if, under
the GATT subsidies code, the WTO were to declare illegal the subsidation
policies of many American states, which give away land and tax abatements,
it is impossible to know how the federal judiciary would respond. There are
no established standards in this area and no caselaw of apparent relevance.
Consequently, as a preliminary matter, the federal judiciary must develop
federalism standards when sovereignty is delegated. One possible approach
would be to extend current jurisprudence limiting federal regulation of the
states to supranational organizations. 2 Another approach would be to
develop separate standards for the threats posed by supranationalism to
American federalism.
Most difficult is the area of due process. As a point of departure, the
German position is that the quality of supranational jurisprudence, particularly
the extent to Which it guards the basic protections of the Bill of Rights, is
more important than the placement. At the same time, resort to Article III
courts must be available not only to challenge the constitutionality of a
delegation of sovereign competences as an initial matter, but to consider later
challenges to protect against changing supranational standards.
Another area of concern is the ability of all three branches to limit
supranational organizations. Congress may pass statutes withdrawing
delegations of sovereign powers or altering such delegations. Nonetheless, as
a practical matter, if supranational organizations possess enforcement powers,
there is very little that any of the three branches can do once sovereign
powers have been delegated, as unilateral attempts to alter the competences
82. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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of a supranational organization by changing national law may result in
sanctions issued by the organization. If the initial domestic law basis for
delegating sovereign powers becomes critical, the ability of the judiciary to
protect constitutional values may be extremely limited without fundamental
changes to judicial processes. If prepassage consideration is critical, for
example, some form of advisory opinion on constitutionality, which would not
conform to the current "case or controversy" requirement of Article III, might
be necessary. Whether such a major change is actually advisable requires
serious deliberation, but it is necessary to begin considering such issues.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF GERMAN INTERNATIONALISM:
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON INTRATERRITORIAL ACTS OF THE
GERMAN GOVERNMENT RELATED TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The BVG does not avoid deciding political questions, yet it often shows
great deference to the political branches. Accordingly, one must question
whether Germany, like the United States, has a constructive version of the
political question doctrine to which the BVG may resort. 3 The deference
shown by the BVG differs in that it is based on the fundamental claim that all
issues are potentially justiciable. The BVG has staked this claim in a wide
variety of areas, including foreign affairs. In fact, from an American
perspective the BVG often seems to overstep the traditional boundary
separating the political branches from the judicial.84 In any case, one may
safely say that the BVG does not have an "active" political question
doctrine. 5
Germany may be considered well ahead of the United States as a
participant in the trend toward ceding sovereign power to international
organizations. A founding member of the European Coal and Steel
Community, Germany has been at the forefront of European integration,
ceding competences to the original European Communities, the European
Community, and-the European Union. As Germany has become more
integrated into the EC, and as the competences of the Community have
grown, the BVG has had to face many of the questions that the judiciary of
the United States will soon face concerning the constitutional implications of
ceding sovereign competences to international organizations.
A. Procedural Restraints
The BVG willingly interprets procedural provisions of the German
Constitution (Grundgesetz), including the limits placed upon the executive by
the sections pertaining to military engagements abroad, treaties, and
83. See, e.g., Judgment of Feb. 16, 1983 (Helmut Kohl's Dissolution of Bundestag), 62 BVerfGE
1; see also infra text accompanying notes 157-58 (discussing Solange and Maastricht decisions).
84. See, e.g., Decision of Aug. 8, 1978 (Kalkar), 49 BVerfGE 89; Judgment of July 19, 1966 (Party
Finance Case), 20 BVerfGE 56; Judgment of Dec. 3, 1968 (Campaign Contribution Case), 24 BVerfGE
300.
85. See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY 163 (1989).
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international organizations. In order to cede sovereign competences, the
executive branch must receive the consent of the legislature in the form of a
law implementing a treaty or agreement.
The exact competences that are being transferred to the international
organization must be specified in the law enabling the transfer. The BVG
retains the right to declare any such law unconstitutional if it is not sufficiently
specific. Furthermore, the BVG retains and exercises the exclusive right to
interpret the meaning of the enabling act. This means that the BVG decides
the exact parameters of the powers that have been transferred. If the
international organization has powers in excess of those delegated, Germany
may not constitutionally participate in exercising such powers ultra vires.
Alternatively, the BVG may declare any such excs de pouvoir a constructive
amendment to the standing laws delegating powers. In accordance with the
procedure laid out in the Grundgesetz governing amendments, any
amendment, whether actual or constructive, requires the consent of the
Bundestag and Bundesrat in the form of a law. The BVG, while recognizing
that it has no jurisdiction to review exercises of power by the European Union
in excess of those delegated by Germany, nonetheless maintains that it has
jurisdiction arising from the constitutional requirements limiting German
delegation of power. Consequently, the BVG has found that acts and
declarations of the European Union that exceed the power delegated by
Germany may be held unconstitutional and hence nonbinding within German
territory.
Most EU acts are carried out by the member states. By restricting its
review of EU actions, the BVG is able to avoid a potential conflict with the
independent organs of the EU. Rather than directly reviewing EU acts, the
BVG reviews the acts of German administrative agencies, albeit in furtherance
of EU legal regulations and norms.
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the BVG adheres to certain precepts of
international comity such as sovereign immunity. For many years the BVG
held that while it could review the acts of German agencies bound by the
Grundgesetz,"6 it would apply its equivalent of sovereign immunity to
European institutions. Out of deference to the character of the EC as a league
of sovereign states, the BVG explicitly held that German courts would not
review the acts of European institutions. 7
In the Eurocontrol88 decision the BVG wrote,
[The BVG] will consider as "acts of the State" . only those acts which are exercises of
power by German governmental institutions bound by the Grundgesetz. Acts of a special
interstate entity created through international treaty, themselves separate from the powers
of the component member states ... do not fall within the term "acts of the State" as that
term is used in the Grundgesetz.8'
86. See, e.g., Decision of June 6, 1967, 22 BVerfGE 91, 92; 6 BVerfGE 290, 295; 6 BVerfGE 15,
18; Decision of Oct. 11, 1951, 1 BVerfGE 10.
87. Decision of June 6, 1967, 22BVerfGE 91, 92; 6 BVerfGE 290, 295; 6 BVerfGE 15, 18;
Decision of Oct. 11, 1951, 1 BVerfGE 10.
88. Decision of June 23, 1981 (Eurocontrol), 58 BVerfGE 1.
89. Id. at 27 (author's translation); see also Decision of Oct. 18, 1967, 22 BVerfGE 293, 295;
Decision of May 29, 1974 (Solange 1), 37 BVerfGE 271, 283, 285 (holding constitutional complaint
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Given the increasingly broad character of EC and EU powers as they
developed over time, the BVG became concerned with the implications of
judicial deference to EU acts within Germany. Generally, the BVG does not
face the prospect of reviewing Community acts directly because government
institutions of member states (rather than independent EU institutions) usually
apply EU law. Solange was the first major case clarifying the role of German
courts in evaluating EC directed actions that were alleged to have violated
basic rights that the Grundgesetz protects. In its decision, the BVG held that
it reserved for itself jurisdiction to review exercises of power in Germany by
institutions of the German state. The BVG will retain jurisdiction if the
Community directs Germany to act in violation of basic individual rights
guaranteed by the Grundgesetz.90 In the Maastricht decision, the BVG
overruled Solange I and held that it would review direct EU acts, in addition
to retaining the power to review the extent to which any such acts go beyond
the German delegated power. That is, the BVG will consider whether
Community acts exceeded the power delegated and hence did not bind
Germany.
Although the application of this position has resulted in some significant
political changes, the BVG has retained the authority to review EU acts when
exercised through German institutions." The BVG's position is based largely
on what it views as a meaningful formal distinction between a "supranational
state," to which the BVG would accord due deference through sovereign
immunity, and a "league of sovereign states" forming an "international
organization," which the BVG asserts does not technically possess
sovereignty. The EU therefore cannot formally receive "sovereign" immunity.
This position of the BVG stands in stark contrast to the literal
interpretation of the Treaty of Rome, which confers on the ECJ the authority
to review Community law and its application.92 The ECJ has held:
national courts... may consider the validity of a Community act and, if they consider that
the grounds put forward before them by the parties in support of invalidity are unfounded,
they may reject them, concluding that the measure is completely valid .... In contrast,
national courts ... themselves have no jurisdiction to declare that acts of Community
institutions are invalid .... Article 173 gives the [EC] exclusive jurisdiction to declare
void an act of a Community institution.93
Tension exists between the power claimed by the BVG and the power claimed
by the ECJ. However, the BVG went to great lengths in the Maastricht
decision to elaborate the relevant roles of the two courts, forcefully
maintaining that there is no real tension between the two courts. 94
against actions of EC inadmissible because EC does not exercise powers of German state).
90. Solange 1, 37 BVerfGE 271, 280; see also Decision of Oct. 22, 1986 (Solange I), 73 BVerfGE
339, 376, 386.
91. See, e.g., Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993 (Maastricht), 89 BVerfGE 155, 156.
92. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 173, 298 U.N.T.S.
11.
93. Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lilbeck-Ost, 1987 ECR 4/99-200; see also Case 26/62,
N.V. Allemeene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie
der Belastingen, 1963 ECR 1.
94. See Maastricht, 89 BVerfGE at 156, 174-75.
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The BVG began that decision by conceding that the ECJ has exclusive
jurisdiction to interpret matters of Community law. At the same time, the
BVG reasserts its exclusive jurisdiction to interpret matters of German
constitutional law, including both the elaboration of basic rights and the
judicial review of federal statutes. This dual power allows the BVG to
consider the ECI's proffered legal interpretation of the European treaties to
be binding and legitimate. The BVG merely compares the scope of the
European Union powers, as lawfully interpreted by the ECJ, with the powers
delegated in statutory form by the Bundestag. All delegations of power must
be by statute, according to the constitutional provisions governing
treatymaking. Powers inhering in the European Union that have not been
delegated by the Bundestag (as interpreted by the BVG) necessitate
supplemental legislation by the Bundestag that the BVG can review for
constitutionality. If the BVG finds that the legislation does not sufficiently
safeguard basic rights, it may declare the statute unconstitutional. In this
manner, the BVG only declares German statutes unconstitutional. This
approach functions similarly to the way in which the ECJ only theoretically
interprets Community law, but practically reviews member state law. In its
formulation of this theory of "constructive amendment," the BVG included a
thinly veiled warning to the ECJ that the BVG would not necessarily tolerate
what it saw as judicial overreaching on the part of the ECJ.95
If a dynamic expansion of the existing Treaties has occurred in the past based on a generous
use of Art. 235 of the [Treaty of Rome] as a 'competence for rounding off the Treaty', on
the idea of inherent responsibilities of the Community (the American doctrine of 'implied
powers'), and on interpretation of the Treaty in the sense of defining the powers of the
Community as broadly as possible (the 'effet utile' doctrine), then it will be necessary in
the future to ensure, when institutions and organs of the Community [i.e., the ECJ] interpret
the powers of the Community, that the [Maastricht] Treaty, fundamentally, differentiates
between the exercise of limited, enumerated powers and Treaty amendments, such that
interpretation of the Treaty cannot be: allowed to equal an expansion of the Treaty; any
interpretation of the powers of the Community which so functions would have no binding
effect on Germany."
Naturally, the effect of this ingenious formulation is to enable German
courts to review European law, de facto if not de jure. According to this
logic, the BVG must hold that any European Union powers falling between
those powers that the ECJ appropriates and those powers that the BVG
concedes it has delegated would be unconstitutional per se in Germany. The
powers would be considered constructive amendments formed through an
unconstitutional procedure. Such constructive amendments are not binding on
Germany. Clearly, this creates the potential for. a situation in which the ECJ
may hold Germany in violation of EU law for failing to implement laws that
the Union legitimately enacts while the BVG insists that Germany cannot
enforce acts promulgated in this manner without violating the German
95. Cf. Judgment of Feb. 16, 1983 (Helinut Kohl's Dissolution of Bundestag), 62 BVerfGE 1
(allowing governmental action to stand but implying that court would not be so quick to allow second
demonstration). Forewarning is a favored device of the BVG when pragmatism dictates that the disfavored
act should be allowed to stand now but be deterred in the future.
96. Maastricht, 89 BVerfGE at 210.
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constitution.
Recognizing this iotential conflict from the outset, the BVG attempted to
delineate the limits of ECJ jurisdiction, writing that "[the ECJ] does not,
however, decide incidental questions of national law of the Federal Republic
of Germany (or of any other member state) with binding force for this
state."97 Naturally, the BVG has no authority to delimit the ECJ's
jurisdiction. Should the BVG decide that the ECJ has overstepped its
jurisdictional boundaries by implicitly or explicitly interpreting member state
law, the BVG will hive no way to "correct" this excks de pouvoir, as it is
subordinate to the ECJ with regard to European law. The ECJ alone must
decide the limits of European law.98
B. Basic Rights
The BVG has been quite pragmatic in its recognition that the European
Union, as an evolving intergovernmental organization, may not be held to
German standards concerning fundamental individual and collective rights. As
a result, the court has developed and consistently followed an evolutionary
theory of review. The court has held that as long as the European Union fails
to safeguard adequately either set of rights, the BVG will retain jurisdiction
to review challenges to European actions, thereby ensuring protection of these
rights. With regard to collective rights derived from the structure of
government, the court has held that as the institutions of the EU are
increasingly accorded competence and as the institutions deepen the
competences they already possess, the strength of collective values must
increase proportionately. This strengthening of collective values may come
through incorporating those values into the evolving governmental architecture
of the EU.
1. Individual Rights
European integration has occurred as an evolutionary process, with the
member states ceding more and more competence to the institutions of the EU
over time. Challenges to fundamental collective values derived from the
structure of German governance, such as federalism and separation of powers,
did not emerge very strongly until the Community amassed substantial
powers. The challenges were voiced most clearly in the constitutional
97. Solange 1, 37 BVerfGE at 281. As the BVG noted:
Certainly, the responsible Community organs can make law, which the responsible German
constitutional organs cannot under the Grundgesetz, and which nonetheless is directly valid
in the Federal Republic of Germany and is to be applied directly. But Art. 24 GG limits this
possibility insofar as an amendment of the Treaty fails under Art. 24 if it would alter the
identity of the current constitution of the Federal Republic by breaking into the structures
which constitute the constitution ... and the same reasoning applies to secondary Community
law.
Id. at 279.
98. Naturally, any court engaged in judicial review will inevitably rule on laws outside its strict
competence insofar as it delineates the limits within which such laws are constitutional. The BVG's
warning here is somewhat hypocritical considering its own excursions into the legal territory reserved to
the civil and criminal courts in Germany.
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complaint arising from German ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. 99 While
the BVG certainly confronted the issue of collective rights, it was forced to
face the constitutional implications of German implementation of Community
law for individual rights."° From its beginning, -the Community addressed
binding and enforceable decisions and regulations to German citizens. The
BVG faced jurisdictional constraints limiting its ability to protect any
individual rights affected by Community actions.
In Solange I and Solange II, the BVG attempted to clarify the limitations
placed on German agencies implementing Community law established through
the Grundgesetz protections that guard fundamental rights. The BVG also
sought to clarify its own role in assuring the continued protection of these
fundamental rights.
In Solange I, a divided BVG began its discussion of these limitations by
noting that article 24 of the Grundgesetz, which governs the transfer of
competences to. intergovernmental institutions, "does not open the way to
amending the basic structure of the Grundgesetz, which forms the basis of its
identity, without a formal amendment to the Grundgesetz. ""' The BVG
declared in the first formulation of its evolutionary theory that
article 24 of the Grundgesetz limits [the] possibility [of Community institutions making law
directly applicable in Germany]. The part of the Grundgesetz dealing with fundamental
rights is an inalienable, essential feature of the current constitution of the Federal Republic
of Germany and one that forms part of the constitutional structure of the
Grundgesetz. . . .As long as this legal certainty, which is not guaranteed merely by the
decisions of the European Court of Justice, favorable though these have been to fundamental
rights, is not achieved in the course of the further integration of the Community, the
reservation derived from article 24 Grundgesetz applies... .Provisionally, therefore, in
the hypothetical case of a conflict between Community law and . . . the guarantees of
fundamental rights in the Grundgesetz, there arises the question of which system of law
takes precedence.. . .In this conflict of norms, the guarantee of fundamental rights in the
Grundgesetz prevails as long as the competent organs of the Community have not removed
the conflict of norms in accordance with the treaty mechanism."
In particular, the BVG initially held that Community institutions,
including the ECJ, did not protect individual rights to the extent necessary
under the Grundgesetz in that the institutional architecture for the protection
of such rights, including case law and other legally binding norms, was not
sufficiently developed." 3 Accordingly, the BVG sanctioned Community law
and its implementation by Germany. Through retaining its power to review
acts taken at the direction of the Community, the BVG maintained the power
to verify that the Community does not violate individual rights guaranteed by
the Grundgesetz.
99. Maastricht, 89 BVerfGe at 165-70.
100. Maastricht, 89 BVerfGE at 175.
101. Solange 1, 37 BVerfGE at 279.
102. Solange 1, 37 BVerfGE at 279-81 (author's translation).
103. It is important to note that, under the evolutionary theory espoused, this critique in no way
signified any lack of legitimacy on the part of the Community institutions. Rather, somewhat
paternalistically, the BVG indicated that, until the Community grew up, the court would have to retain its
role as overseer. See infra Part III.A.
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The result is: As long as the integration process has not progressed so far that Community
law also receives a catalogue of fundamental rights decided on by a parliament and of settled
validity, which is adequate in comparison with the catalogue of fundamental rights contained
in the Grundgesetz, a reference by a court in the Federal Republic of Germany to the [BVG]
after having obtained a [preliminary] ruling of the European Court... is admissible and
necessary if the German court regards the Community law that is relevant to its decision as
inapplicable in the interpretation given by the European Court, because and insofar as it
conflicts with one of the fundamental rights in the Grundgesetz. 1°4
In a challenge to a commercially directed action brought a few years later, the
BVG declared that the ECJ had developed sufficient institutional architecture
through caselaw for the protection of individual rights to merit withdrawal of
BVG review in practice.tS Even though the BVG once again reserved, in
principle, the right to review Community acts in order to protect individual
rights, the practical meaning of the second opinion was to end German review
of Community acts based on challenges sounding in individual rights.
2. Collective/Systemic Rights
Since the ratification of the Treaty of Rome, the BVG has grappled with
the effect of the expansion of European Union powers on systemic rights that
are embodied in the Grundgesetz. The BVG cases evince a strong desire to
protect these rights while minimizing discord with EU institutions. The BVG
has emphasized several areas of systemic values in its jurisprudence, including
separation' of powers, governmental legitimacy as measured by the
"democracy principle,"'' and rule of law, federalism, and the system of
enumerated powers outlined by the Grundgesetz.
a. Separation of Powers
Preservation of the extant structure of separation of powers emerged as
a primary concern of the Bundestag and Bundesrat before consideration of the
Maastricht Treaty. In response to these concerns, the legislature amended
article 23(1) of the Grundgesetz to ensure that the Bundestag and Bundesrat
would retain their joint legislative role.'0 7 Under article 23(1), "the
Federation may transfer sovereign powers by statute with the concurrence of
the Bundesrat.""'' Article 23(2) states that both bodies "shall participate in
affairs of the European Union," and also requires the executive to inform both
bodies before and after consideration of legislation by the Council. Each body
must be consulted when an action relates to the relevant body's enumerated
104. Solange 1, 37 BVerfGE at 285 (author's translation).
105. Solange 11, 73 BVerfGE at 378 (holding that European Court had achieved certain minimum
quantity of protection of basic rights).
106. I use the term "democracy principle" to refer to the BVG doctrine. See GRUNDOESETZ art.
79(3); Manford H. Wiegandt, Germany's International Integration: The Rulings of the German Federal
Constitutional Court on the Maastricht Treaty and the Out-of-Area Deployment of German Troops, 10 AM.
U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 889, 895 (1995).
107. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Press & Info. Office of Fed. Gov't ed., 1994).
108. GRuNDcEsETz art. 23(1).
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powers."o
As amended, article 23 went a: long way toward preserving the existing
separation of powers, and. was cited approvingly by the BVG. The
amendment, however, did not assuage the complainants, who argued that
article 23 should itself be deemed unconstitutional because the structure of the
EU legislative process gives .the chancellor exclusive authority to decide
whether to agree to EU lawmaking."n The exclusive role of the chancellor
introduces "in practice a principle of pure executive management into the
Grundgesetz.""'
The complaint went on to allege that:
the democracy principle and the separation of powers demanded by the principle of rule of
law are injured if the Maastricht Treaty withdraws wide areas of lawmaking and the
regulation of fundamental factual issues from the jurisdiction of the Bundestag and shifts
them to the executive branch. The legislative process of the Community is a matter handled
by the Council of Ministers and the European Commission, both parts of the executive; the
European Parliament is no lawmaker. In contrast to the Bundestag, the 'EU lawmaker' has
no direct, unmediated democratic legitimation at the Community level, but rather derives
its democratic legitimacy in an indirect, mediated manner from the legitimacy of the
individual member states1
2
The BVG acknowledged the potency of this argument, but rejected the
complainant's further argument that the decisions of the Council could not be
sufficiently legitimated through the aggregate contribution of the member state
parliaments. As part of its evolutionary theory of EU legitimation, the BVG
held that at its current stage, legitimation through the national parliaments was
equivalent to legitimation through an empowered European Parliament. As the
portfolios of the EU have increased, so too have the powers of the Strasbourg
parliament. Because the evolution has been proportional, the BVG continues
not to object to the institutional architecture of the EU, but retains jurisdiction
to review the structure as necessary to ensure parliamentary legitimation. The
BVG thus limited itself to warning that too much power on the part of the
EU, without a concomitant increase in the power of the European Parliament,
would be unconstitutional because an executive-dominated EU could no longer
obtain legitimacy through the national parliaments.
Interestingly, the BVG rejected the central argument of the complaint.
The petitioner argued that too much EU power is dangerous regardless of the
institutional legitimacy of the EU, because increasing EU power necessarily
weakens the national parliaments, endangering the sovereign nature and
legitimacy of the member states." 3 The complaint further alleged that the
EU marked the beginning of a federal state, as opposed to a league of
sovereign states, and that the "Federal Republic of Germany" would cease to
exist per se." 4 The complaint went on to argue that the demise of the
109. Id. art. 23(2). Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Press & Info. Office of Fed.
Gov't ed., 1994).
110. The Council of Ministers, which makes laws, is composed of members of the executive
branches of the Member States.
111. Maastricht, 89 BVerfGE at 168.
112. Id. at 169.
113. Id. at 181.
114. Id. at 169.
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Federal Republic would require a referendum in order to be legal. The BVG
has consistently held that the EU is in no way sovereign, but is rather a
"league of sovereign states," 5 implicitly maintaining that the structure of
separation of powers in the EU does not impinge upon the structure in
Germany except insofar as discrete powers are shifted to the EU. This legal
fiction allows the BVG to claim formalistically that the national parliaments,
particularly the Bundestag, cannot lose power because of the development of
the EU. The court maintains that the Bundestag still has considerable power
because "the dynamic process of further European integration contains
dependable limits that establish a balance between the structure of
intergovernmental decisionmaking in the European league of states and the
role played by the Bundestag as preliminary decisionmaker and
codecisionmaker. "116
The BVG further attempted to refute the argument that too much EU
power is inherently dangerous by outlining how the German parliament would
remain influential in the specific area of economic and monetary union
(EMU). The BVG's argument is twofold. First, the Bundestag must be
consulted as part of the process by which the German government decides
how to vote on EMU. This process, set forth in the Maastricht Treaty,
demands that member states meet strict economic criteria. Second, the
Bundestag must approve entry into the third stage of EMU even if the
convergence criteria are modified. This is the case because the current text of
the Maastricht Treaty, requiring "currency stability" as a goal and outlining
specific criteria for national qualification, cannot be changed without qualified
majority approval of the Council. Accordingly, unanimity requires German
approval of the measures. '
Both arguments are unpersuasive. The second is especially problematic
because the Commission can interpret the criteria more liberally than the
BVG, as it has already done. As to the first argument, the Bundestag
theoretically retains power over this area inasmuch as the executive must have
the approval of the Bundestag in the form of a law in order to vote to approve
economic and monetary union. "'The transition to the third stage of economic
and monetary union also requires a judgment of the German Bundestag.
Accordingly, the executive branch must receive a vote of approval from the
Bundestag to determine how it votes for decisions of the Council concerning
article 109(J)(3) and (4) of the Maastricht Treaty.'""1 8 The court indicated
that the Bundestag has the right to review the materials presented to the
Council of Ministers, after which the executive votes before any such vote
115. See, e.g., SolangeI, 37 BVerfGE271, 278 ("[T]he Community is not a state, in particular not
a federal state, but rather a 'Community of a unique type standing in the process of progressive
integration,' a 'league of sovereign states' in the sense of Grundgesetz art. 24(1)."); Solange 11, 73
BVerfGE 339, 374 (referring to EU as "league of sovereign states"). Most commentary stands in
opposition. The EU has exclusive competence that preempts the legislative purview of the member states
over a wide variety of areas. See supra Part II.B.2.
116. Maastricht, 89 BVerfGE at 207 (author's translation).
117. Id. at 202.
118. Id. at 169 (quoting Session of Bundestag, Dec. 2, 1992, Decision Relating to Economic and
Currency Union, Bundestag Drucksache 12/3906) (author's translation).
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takes place under the amended article 23.119
But these restrictions are not really enforceable against the executive. In
fact, these obligations are largely hortatory. Although it did not explicitly say
so, the BVG appears to have interpreted the second sentence of article 23(2),
which states that "the executive shall inform the Bundestag and the Bundesrat
comprehensively and at the earliest time possible,"12 to mean that the
legislature will have access to the same materials as the executive and that the
BVG will enforce such information as a constitutional requirement under
article 23. Aside from the practical difficulties of such a requirement, the
Bundestag itself recognized that the executive does not have to follow the
vote, writing that "the German Bundestag demands that the executive declare
that this vote of the Bundestag will be respected."12 Finance Minister
Waigel wrote a letter indicating that the executive had every intention of
following the Vote of the Bundestag. Of course, the letter is not binding on
Finance Minister Waigel or his successors. Recognizing the nature of the
letter, the BVG held that it would enforce the process agreed upon in the
exchange of resolutions as the appropriate means to ensure an adequate
separation of powers.
Perhaps most important, in its discussion of constructive amendments the
BVG held that any change or expansion of the powers of the EU not
encompassed by the BVG's interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty would
require a law passed by the Bundestag to bind Germany.'2 As a summary
point, the BVG also warned that "duties and power of substantial weight must
remain in the hands of the Bundestag."'m Strikingly, the court based this
conclusion largely on its view of the dichotomy between the EU as a league
of states and the member states as sovereign nations:
The Member States need a sufficiently meaningful set of tasks through which their citizens,
as peoples, can develop and articulate themselves, in a process of building the political will
of the citizenry legitimated and steered by the citizens of the relevant State, in order to give
legal expression in the process to that which binds the - relatively homogeneous - people
spiritually, socially and politically."
This philosophy, in which nationality is paramount, does not bode well for
German recognition of an EU federal state; such a state cannot exist because
there is no European nation. Consequently, the BVG remains cautious as it
questions the legitimacy of the EU's growth to a full federalist state.
b. The "Democracy Principle" and Rule of Law
Consistent with the discussion about separation of powers is the BVG's
119. "The vote of the German Bundestag is based on the same material as the evaluation of the
Council of Ministers when comprised of the Economic and Finance Ministers, and the decision of the
Council of Ministers when comprised of the heads of state and government." Id. at 163-66 (author's
translation).
120. GRUNDGESETZ art. 23(2).
121. Maastricht, 89 BVerfGE at 163 (author's translation).
122. Id. at 156, 187-88.
123. Id. at 186.
124. [1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 88-89 (Brunner v. European Union Treaty).
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profound concern regarding the legitimacy of German governmental
structures. Because Germany has been shifting many traditional governmental
functions to the EU, the BVG perspicaciously has monitored the institutional
architecture of the EU, elaborating conditions for EU legitimacy.
The German trend toward shifting powers to the EU affects German
separation of powers and the legitimacy of German governmental institutions
while simultaneously affecting the EU distribution of powers and the
legitimacy of the EU. Following the BVG's evolutionary theory, increased EU
executive powers necessitate increased legislative oversight through a
popularly elected legislature. Legitimacy is the underlying concern of the
BVG in addressing both of these political systems and the tension between
them. In its discussions of legitimacy, the BVG has often focused on what it
calls the "democracy principle."
Two main ideas contribute to the principle:
(1) state power must be traceable to voters, since the exercise of state power is legitimated
through the formation of the political will by elected representatives;
(2) given that the EU is not a state and accrues new functions over time, forging an identity
-in an evolutionary process, the level of democratic legitimacy may similarly evolve."5
Addressing the claim that all state power must be traced back to popular
delegation, the BVG holds that this principle can be achieved in a variety of
ways. Legitimation does not necessarily require direct elections. Complex
governmental bodies may achieve legitimation through appointment or
oversight by elected officials.'26 Such oversight represents a minimum
requirement without which a governmental entity is illegitimate.' 27 The BVG
has held, in an adjunct to its evolutionary theory, that the EU has achieved
that minimum level of legitimation through its character as a league of states
that individually are sufficiently democratic. 128
The BVG's reliance on the character of member states' governments goes
further. In response to the complaint's charge that the majority rule principle
in the Council would preclude the transfer of legitimacy from the legislature
to the EU, the BVG noted that "constitutional principles and elementary
interests, of the member states limit the use of the majority rule
principle."19 While the BVG asserts both points, it is unclear exactly how
these limitations would function. The United Kingdom has no written
constitution. France does not have a constitutional court with judicial review.
The divergent practices in the member states lend some credence to the
complainant's fears. One wonders whether the BVG's assertions are really
legal principles or recognitions of political expediency.
While the character of the member states is a component of legitimacy,
125. Maastricht, 89 BVerfGE at 185-86.
126. Judgment of Oct. 31, 1990 (Hamburg Law Concerning the Introduction of Voting Rights for
Foreigners), 83 BVerfGE 60, 72 (noting that while county and neighborhood elections may require
personal legitimation of governing entities at that level, municipal committees, administrative agencies,
and other more complex governmental vehicles are legitimate as long as they may trace their legitimacy
back to local voters and elections).
127. See Maastricht, 89 BVerfGE at 182.
128. See id. at 184-88.
129. Id. at 184.
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the BVG also requires that the EU, as an entity, have an independent base of
legitimacy derived from the population of the entire EU. Such legitimation
occurs primarily through the European Parliament. Accordingly, the BVG has
held that as the EU grows in power, the European Parliament must also
increase in power. 3'
c. Federalism
The BVG has traditionally shown concern for preserving the role of the
Ldnder in the Federal Republic. The BVG has been diligent in policing the
federal government's use of article 75, which authorizes the federation to
effect uniform national policies through the issuance of laws in areas
traditionally assigned to the Ldinder."' The court also has restricted federal
leeway in areas in which the U.S. Supreme Court has been reluctant to tread,
such as the spending power. 132
This concern has also been prevalent in the political branches, perhaps
reflecting the role of the Bundesrat as more representative of the states than
the modern U.S. Senate. The political branches alleviated many potential
constitutional problems sounding in federalism through the enactment of
articles 23 and 52(3). These enabling amendments allowed for ratification of
the Maastricht Treaty. Article 23 provides for certain procedural safeguards
to ensure the participation of the Bundestag and Bundesrat in the process of
EU legislation and decisionmaking. Article 52(3) authorizes the Bundesrat to
create an EU committee to coordinate and control Bundesrat deliberations on
EU matters.
The amendments reduced any pressure on the BVG arising from
federalism. Nonetheless, the BVG did address the issue. The court referred
explicitly to article 79 as the appropriate mechanism for German authorization
of expanded EU powers. Article 79 provides that "the Federation can, through
a law, with the approval of the Bundesrat, transfer powers." 133
In the face of German integration into a nascent European federal state,
the BVG has had considerable difficulty maintaining the federal-state balance
of powers in Germany. These problems are at the heart of Bayerische
Staatsregierung v. Bundesregierung,'34 a case from the late 1980s. In
Bayerische Staatsregierung, the BVG denied an interim injunction preventing
the federal government from voting in favor of a directive harmonizing rules
on television broadcast in the Council, despite the Linder's authority in the
130. See id. at 184. Some of the other conditions the court listed for legitimation of the EU
institutions by the peoples of the EU include:
(1) transparent and comprehensible decisionmaking processes and policy goals in the Council,
Commission, and EU organ[s];
(2) the ability of voters to communicate with all of the organs of the EU and their
representatives in their own languages;
(3) formation of the political will in a marketplace of ideas.
Id. at 185 (author's translation).
131. See, e.g., Judgment of Dec. 1, 1954 (Northrhine-Westphalia Salaries Case), 4 BVerfGE 115
(1954) (upholding differential salary scale in states).
132. See Judgment of Nov. 18, 1954 (Financial Subsidies Case), 39 BVerfGE 96 (1975).
133. GRn ErDoSmZ art. 79.
134. Judgment of Apr. 11, 1989, 80 BVerfGE 74.
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matter. In defense of its holding the Court argued that:
[If the claim were well founded], the federal Government would have encroached on an area
constitutionally reserved to the [Bavarian government] .... But in the Federal
Government's view the content [of the Community legislation eventually adopted] could be
shaped in a way that takes more account of the jurisdiction of the LUnder if the government
can use-the room to maneuver available to it [by participating]. 3 5
While this may be true as a practical matter, it confers a role on the executive
otherwise forbidden in German domestic policymaking; it is an encroachment
of the federal government into a sphere traditionally reserved to the Liinder.
The case stands in stark opposition to a German case involving the same
policy issues. In the First Television Case,'36 the Court rejected Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer's attempt to create a national television channel, holding
that "[t]he federal government has no authority to regulate broadcasting"
beyond the technical aspects of transmission.' 37
Bayerische Staatsregierung can be understood as an expression of the
difficult task of preserving federalism while seeking to recognize the
traditional role of the executive in foreign affairs. Yet, the court's
jurisprudence in similar cases not involving the EU seems to belie that
argument. In the* Concordat case,'38 the court held that although a treaty
with the Vatican predating the foundation of the Federal Republic was valid
and enforceable, those provisions of the treaty that contradicted the
Grundgesetz were unenforceable. Specifically, the court held that provisions
of the treaty guaranteeing publicly funded parochial schooling in Germany
were unenforceable against Liinder that chose to fund only nondenominational
public schools. The court argued that traditional executive prerogatives in
foreign affairs could not invade those policy areas, such as education, that the
Grundgesetz specifically reserves to the Liinder. While the case presents some
unusual circumstances, including a treaty signed by the Nazi government
rather than the Federal Republic, the court made it clear that the federalist
concerns were paramount. It seems that Bayerische Staatsregierung should be
understood as arising partly from doubt and partly from deference to the EU.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF AMERICAN INTERNATIONALISM
Why should the United States be concerned with ceding sovereign
competences to a supranational organization as a constitutional matter rather
than simply as a policy matter? The primary reason for concern is that ceding
sovereign competences threatens the existing separation of powers structure
that plays a central role in our constitutional order. Ceding sovereign
competences strengthens the executive branch at the expense of the legislative
and judicial branches. How pronounced the shifts are depends in part on
judicial doctrine; in part, the shifts are unavoidable.
This part does not purport to elaborate the entire constitutional structure
135. Id. at 80 (author's translation).
136. Judgment of Feb. 28, 1961, 12 BVerfGE 205.
137. Id. at 237 (author's translation).
138. 6 BVerfGE 309.
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as it pertains to internationalism. Rather, this part has two aims: first, to
examine some of the risks implicated in ceding sovereign competences and to
examine the current weaknesses in the U.S. constitutional order that
exacerbate the risks; second, to look at some recent cases and explore exactly
which risks are actually emerging as important.
There are two main weaknesses in the existing constitutional framework
regarding internationalism. The first involves a group of judicial doctrines and
interpretations that limits judicial review of domestic acts. These include the
jurisprudence surrounding the treaty power, the political question doctrine,
and deference to executive decisions in foreign policy. The second weakness
concerns a set of judicial doctrines that limits judicial review of the acts of
foreign sovereigns and, by implication, supranational organizations.
The effects of these weaknesses are twofold. Most apparently, these
doctrines strengthen the executive branch at the expense of the legislative and
judicial branches. In response to an adverse decision of a supranational body
such as the WTO, for instance, there is a spectrum of possible responses.
There are four major points in this continuum: (1) ignoring the decision; (2)
negotiating with the opposing state; (3) domestic judicial rejection of the WTO
decision; (4) withdrawal from the WTO. The character of a supranational
organization essentially eliminates the first and fourth options. Faced with a
body such as the WTO that can enforce its decisions through fines levied by
the injured states (rather than a body such as the ICJ dependent on the
voluntaristic accession of member states to its rulings) the United States
cannot ignore the decision. Similarly, the impact of withdrawing upon the
domestic economy would be such that withdrawal is not feasible. Thus, the
power of the legislative branch when confronting a supranational organization
is transformed to a more theoretic power. At the very least, the congressional
arsenal is restricted to the blunt instrument of withdrawal. Minor adjustments
to the legal relationship are not possible.
This leaves two possible reactions: judicial review and negotiation carried
out by the extreme branch. The breadth of judicial review is profoundly
limited by doctrines granting deference to the executive. While the federal
judiciary could play an active role in monitoring a supranational organization,
it is likely to continue its current policy of deferring to the executive branch.
Except in the exaggerated case in which the substance of a treaty delegating
sovereign competences is unconstitutional on its face, the judiciary will
probably refrain from acting. This leaves only negotiation by the executive
branch as an available option.
The judicial role I will outline in this part stands in marked contrast to the
role adopted by the BVG. The German court has played an active role in
elaborating the procedural requirements of delegating sovereign competences
and has monitored the actions of the European Union. In this latter role, the
court has developed a highly nuanced doctrine of review that allows it to
accept the constitutionality of a treaty delegating sovereign competences, such
as the Maastricht Treaty, while rejecting actions of the EU that it perceives
as beyond the powers delegated by Germany.
The second major weakness in the current American constitutional
framework in this area is judicial reluctance to review the acts of foreign
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sovereigns, and, by implication, supranational organizations. This second
accumulation of jurisprudence determines the potential strength of
supranational organizations vis-h-vis the United States as nation-state by
determining the ability of the three branches to limit the actions of
supranational organizations.
If the judiciary refuses to review the acts of supranationals, which seems
likely, the ability of the judiciary to maintain the current constitutional order
will be jeopardized. Unless the judiciary monitors supranationals and accepts
domestic cases challenging supranationals, constructive constitutional
amendment may occur. Some of the potential changes include reduction of the
scope of cases that Article I courts may hear, of the extent to which
Congress participates in delegating competences, and of the extent to which
the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive branch. Unless the judiciary
reacts to such shifts, they become a constructive part of the U.S.
constitutional order.
This part first examines some of the judicial doctrines and interpretations
limiting judicial review mentioned above, including the treaty power, the
political question doctrine, deference to executive foreign affairs decisions, the
act of state doctrine, and foreign sovereign immunity.
After outlining how these doctrines are relevant, I turn to examining some
recent cases in which the United States has delegated competences to
supranational organizations, including the WTO and the Canada-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement. The discussion will serve to grapple more concretely with
some of the threats to our current constitutional order.
A. Defending Constitutional Values When Sovereign Competences are Ceded:
Treaties
As a threshold matter, it is clear that cessions of sovereign competences
must find their basis in American law, whether in formal treaties or in
executive agreements. Such instruments of domestic law may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court to ensure that procedural strictures governing the
lawmaking process as well as substantive restrictions based on individual
rights are followed. The primary means at the disposal of the federal judiciary
to defend constitutional values against unacceptable delegations of sovereign
competences is the treaty power. "9 Review of exercises of the treaty power
can be used in two ways: to ensure that the process of treatymaking follows
constitutionally defined procedures, which themselves serve to protect
separation of powers goals; and to ensure that a treaty's delegation of
government functions is not so broad as to impinge unacceptably upon the
present constitutional order.
The treaty power is contained in article II, section 2(2) of the U.S.
Constitution. Sectiofi 2(2) contains some procedural requirements, notably that
the President receive the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate in
139. Other possible means, including the Appointments Clause (Article II, Section 2(2)), will not
be discussed here because there is no evidence they would be limiting. Part IV considers some additional
areas that should be brought into the analysis based on recent experiences, including Article Il1.
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order to enter into a treaty. As a theoretical matter, judicial review of the
procedural requirements implied by the treaty power could be an important
vehicle to blunt the threat to separation of power values created by the
executive's cession of sovereign competences to supranational organizations.
Some scholars argue that the advice and consent requirement is alive and well
and that treaties cannot be formed without it."
A more practical consideration of Supreme Court jurisprudence creates
some doubt about the real procedural limits created by the treaty power. The
rise of the executive agreement presents a real challenge to the claim that the
apparent procedural requirements of the treaty power protect the separation
of powers by ensuring congressional participation in agreements with foreign
states or with international or supranational organizations. Some scholars,
noting judicial acceptance of executive agreements, even describe the
executive agreement as a constructive amendment of the treaty power - a
new form of treatymaking procedure. 141
In addition to procedural restraints, the treaty power can be interpreted
to impose restraints on the substantive content of treaties. There are cases
indicating that treaties cannot be used to expand the powers of a branch of
government beyond those granted by the Constitution. 142 Justice Black
suggested in his dissent in Reid v. Covert that a treaty cannot authorize what
the Constitution forbids, including "a change in the character of the
government or in that of one of the States." 43 As Black noted, "such
construction would permit amendment of [the Constitution] in a manner not
sanctioned by Article V. " 44
What Justice Black writes seems self-evident to some. However, it is far
from self-evident. In order to achieve such a goal, the judiciary would have
to interpret treaties willingly and monitor their execution to ensure compliance
with Justice Black's stricture. Unfortunately, this does not occur. As noted
above, the Supreme Court refuses to interpret the procedural requirements of
the treaty power. Aside from such large questions of the legitimacy of
executive agreements, the Court has been unwilling to decide apparently
simple issues such as whether the President must obtain senatorial approval
to terminate a treaty that has been approved through the advise and consent
process. 14- The Court has been even more reluctant to review the substance
140. Lawrence Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1269 (1995).
141. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV.
801 (1995).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 207-08 (1926) (holding that treaty
interpretation must conform to constitutional mandate that divesting property requires act of Congress);
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (holding that treaty within ability of federal government to
change boundaries of state governments); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620-21 (1870)
(holding that Act of Congress supersedes treaty); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853)
(holding that under legitimate treaty taking requires compensation). In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957),
the Court implied in dicta that it would review treaties substantively.
None of these cases, however, suggests that an expansion of the power of one branch, within
constitutionally accepted limits, at the expense of another branch, would be unconstitutional.
143. 354 U.S. at 17-18 (citing Geofroy, 133 U.S. at 267).
144. Id. at 17.
145. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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of treaties. Although the constitutionality of some classes of treaties, such as
arms control treaties, has been widely questioned by commentators,'46 the
Supreme Court has never actually held a treaty to be in violation of the treaty
power. 47
Even if the federal judiciary did actively review treaties, it would still be
exercising a limited power. Since the Court will review treaties only after they
are enacted, it may be restricted in its ability to influence discrete treaty
provisions. Moreover, the Court does not have a strong tradition of
monitoring treaty execution. It may be unwilling to do more than review a
treaty once, for procedural and substantive soundness. If a treaty is
procedurally and substantively sound, could or would the Court review the
operation of the treaty? The Court has not held that it would act as treaty
overseer, monitoring the continuing operation of a treaty.
While there is some precedent for the judiciary to perform such a
function,' the Court would necessarily have to confront the supranational
body in the case of a treaty ceding competence§. In such a case, it would not
be clear that the Court itself would have competence to review the acts of the
supranational entity, and conflict would necessarily arise. The German
constitutional court faced precisely these issues and found it difficult to make
minor alterations to delegations of power or to confront the supranational
body. In addition, the BVG had to fight to justify its jurisdiction over the
issues.' 49 The United States Supreme Court would have to develop its own
theories to support such review.
If Justice Black's argument in Reid represents an idealized version of
constitutional protection, it is interesting to note what he thought were the
risks inherent in internationalization and the limits to which the judiciary
should be willing to go. Black argued that the protections and limitations on
the exercise of governmental power cannot be discarded simply to facilitate
American interaction with other countries. In a warning strikingly similar to
that of the German constitutional court in its Maastricht judgment, he wrote
that
[t]he concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against arbitrary
government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates
otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit
of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our Government. If our foreign
commitments become of such nature that the Government can no longer satisfactorily
operate within the bounds laid down by the Constitution, that instrument can be amended
by the method which it prescribes. But we have no authority, or inclination, to read
146. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, ARMS CONTROL AND INSPECTION IN AMERICAN LAW (1958) (citing
warrantless searches of private persons); Thomas A. Connolly, Warrantless On-Site Inspections for Anns
Control Verification: Are They Constitutional?, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 179, 207-10 (1987) (same); David
A. Koplow, Arms Control Inspection: Constitutional Restrictions on Treaty Verification in the United
States, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 229, 291-92 (1988) (same); Edward A. Tanzman, Constitutionality of
Warrantless On-Site Inspections in the United States, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 21 (1988) (same); Edward A.
Tanzman & Barry Kelman, Legal Implementation of the Multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention:
Integrating International Security with the Constitution, 22 INT'L L. & POL. 475, 500-12 (1990) (same).
147. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 302-303 (1986).
148. The judiciary has performed a similar function in the school desegregation context.
149. See supra Part III.
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exceptions into it which are not there. 5 I
B. Current Weaknesses: Lack of Judicial Review of Executive Action
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that "a
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of
Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on
'Executive Power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art. H.""' While the
Court later cast doubt on this particular formulation,152 it is clear that the
Court is inclined to defer to executive action. This deference can also be seen
in cases where the Court has engaged in active judicial review by ascribing
limits to the legislative branch. 153
Dames & Moore is part and parcel of an adjudicatory framework highly
reliant on two important judicial strategies to accommodate the executive
branch: the political question doctrine and judicial interpretation of the foreign
affairs power of the President. While both strategies have important,
justifiable defenses, they generate tremendous risk when sovereign powers are
ceded.
Chief Justice John Marshall gave life to the political question doctrine in
the case credited with the birth of judicial review, Marbury v. Madison. In a
famqus dictum, Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important
political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable
only to his country in his political character and his own conscience . . .The application
of this remark will be perceived by adverting to the act of congress for establishing the
department of foreign affairs .... The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be
examinable by the courts. c
Whether one accepts a public choice account155 of judicial abdication or
efficiency-oriented explanations, it is clear that judges have been reluctant to
review foreign affairs questions on the merits and have often resorted to the
political question doctrine to justify this reluctance. Broadly defined, the
political question doctrine, as described by Chief Justice Marshall, emerges
from the assumption that policymaking should be left to the political branches
with the Court delimiting those powers and should be judged by the electorate
so long as the political branches operate within the scope of their enumerated
powers. When they have applied it to foreign affairs, however, later judges
150. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957).
151. 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (quoting Youngstown v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
152. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13 (1983).
153. See, e.g., id.
154. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803).
155. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) (arguing that
judicial intrusion into foreign affairs is unjustified because risk that political branches will not follow such
decisions is augmented in foreign affairs); THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICiAL
ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992) (arguing that beginning with
Marbury, courts have retreated from deciding foreign affairs questions as payment for judicial review of
domestic questions).
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have built upon Marshall's point by assuming that the scope of judicial review
should be proportional to the level of national security interest embodied in
a particular policy area. 56 On the basis of this further assumption, judges
have used the doctrine to shield executive action related to foreign affairs
from judicial review even when it is alleged that the President has acted ultra
vire's. Such a result has been achieved through both formal invocation of the
doctrine and constructive use of the doctrine in cases in which judges decide
the merits in favor of the executive in deference to such values as separation
of powers and judicial restraint. 57
While the exact boundaries, not to mention the legitimacy, of the political
question doctrine are subject to dispute, one may reasonably expect that
situations such as cession of sovereign competences to international
organizations will engage the same concerns, due to the reduced level of
judicial review implied by the doctrine. All substantive defenses of the
political question doctrine arise from the realization that the bulk of foreign
policy relates in some way to national security, an area in which the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, is particularly unfettered.'58 Prudence
dictates that a tactically aware country should speak with a single voice. 59
Such a concern has led the Supreme Court to argue in dicta that the President
is the "sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations" and that executive power in this area is "plenary and
exclusive."160 Many judges and commentators have asserted that foreign
affairs questions present technical problems that the judiciary cannot resolve.
Justice Brennan elaborated on this position in Baker v. Carr,' where he
wrote that judges are justified in refusing to decide cases without "judicially
discoverable and manageable standards."62 This rubric covers cases in
156. Some commentators have argued that this view is itself a radical change in Marshall's position,
in that while Marshall's position affirms the Court's role as arbiter of the limits on the power of the
political branches, the later adaptation allows the Court's interpretation to be merely one among equals,
with the Court deferring to decisions on the part of the political branches as long as those branches believe
they have acted intra vires. See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 155, at 31.
157. See, e.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (adopting proexecutive branch interpretation
of treaty); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (reversing state court interpretation differing from
executive branch); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902) (declining to interpret treaty status of
successor country to Prussia); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862) (upholding post blockade
seizure of foreign vessels that landed pre blockade); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829)
(declining to determine treaty status of Florida property); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (finding tacit congressional approval of war).
158. In United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), for example, a case often cited as limiting the
political question doctrine, the Supreme Court held that the federal judiciary had jurisdiction to review
domestic actions by the executive, even if under color of the war power, but that it could not review such
actions if extraterritorial. Id. at 209.
159. "In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems,
the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation." United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); see also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937).
160. Curiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
161. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that state electoral district reapportionment was
not political question).
162. Id. at 217.
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which the judiciary cannot find facts," confronts preexisting factual
interpretations of other branches,' 64 or faces policy choices already made by
other branches.
65
The prominence of the political question doctrine has meant that in
practice the President has not had to adhere to the formal procedural
limitations of such apparently clear constitutional provisions as the war power
of Article I, Section 8, which reserves the power to declare war to the
Congress, or the treaty power enumerated in Article II, Section 2, not least
because the judiciary has not delimited the scope of the terms "declare war"
and "make Treaties." Courts have been extremely reluctant to declare military
engagements sponsored by the executive to be illegal, constructive
declarations of war without congressional consent. They most often have
dismissed such challenges as political questions.
166
The judiciary "withdraws" deference to the executive branch most
163. Courts, for example, may find it difficult to provide answers that depend on deciding contested
sovereignty. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (expropriation of
assets by revolutionary Cuban government); Pearcy v. Stranahan, 205 U.S. 257 (1907) (U.S.-Cuban
dispute over Isle of Pines); Williams v. Suffolk Ins., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839) (Argentine-British
dispute over Falkland Islands); Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum,
577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979) (British-Iranian dispute over Persian
Gulf island).
164. Justice Brennan warned explicitly against "the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217; see also
Harisiades v. Shaugnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (deportation of aliens); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S.
202, 212 (1890) (holding plaintiff countries entitled to sue U.S.); Panama v. Republic National Bank, 681
F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (concerning seizure of Panamanian assets following coup).
165. See, e.g., Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.) (holding that there is no private cause of
action under Hostage Act), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 954 (1988); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307,
1315 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that congressperson lacks standing to challenge executive order absent denial
of right to vote), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
166. See, e.g., Mitchell, 488 F.2d 611 (Vietnam War); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C.
1987) (suit by members of Congress challenging military presence in El Salvador); Conyers v. Reagan,
578 F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1984), dismissed as moot, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (invasion of
Grenada); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (suit by members of Congress challenging
military presence in El Salvador), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689
(E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973) (Vietnam War); The Prize
Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862) (constitutionality of seizure of ships trading with Confederacy without
official declaration of war); United States v. Baker, 24 F. Cas. 962 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 14,501)
(constitutionality of presidential claim that act of piracy was naval engagement without official declaration
of war). Unlike the treaty power, though, the Supreme Court has limited the war power when it conflicts
with other constitutional values such as property rights. In Mitchell v. Harmony, the Supreme Court held
that the seizure of property belonging to a civilian merchant working in an area of Mexico occupied by
the United States could not be justified under the war power unless the government could prove to a trial
court that the chances of his goods being seized by the enemy were "immediate and impending, and not
remote or contingent.., an immediate and pressing danger or urgent necessity existing at the time." 54
U.S. (13 How.) 115, 133 (1851). The Court held that the executive branch held the burden of proving its
contention. In the Steel Seizure Case, the Court held that the President could not nationalize an industry
of vital military importance during ongoing hostilities even if the industry was hampered by a strike.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In the Pentagon Papers case, the
Supreme Court held that the danger to national security caused by publication of classified military
information during ongoing hostilities asserted by the executive was outweighed by the First Amendment
principle guaranteeing freedom of speech. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
Even when the courts have found for the executive, they have sometimes placed the burden of proving the
severity of the ostensible threat to national security on the executive. United States v. Progressive, Inc.,
467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
436 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21: 395
regularly when executive policy conflicts with civil rights. In such cases,
judicial deference tends to take the form of constructive use of the political
question doctrine rather than a simple statement that the issue is
nonjusticiable. In cases where the petitioner claims a violation of due process,
the Court tends to utilize the constructive version of the doctrine if it wishes
to defer to the executive. 67
The Supreme Court has often adhered to a constructive version of the
political question doctrine designed more to add legitimacy ex post to actions
undertaken by the Executive than to limit its actions. By deciding cases on the
merits in favor of the Executive, the Supreme Court actually expands the
scope of the political question doctrine.'68 In cases in which lower courts
have declared executive actions unconstitutional after reviewing them on the
merits, the Supreme Court has stepped in to affirm that substantive review
should be used as a formal legitimation device rather than as an actual test of
the boundaries of executive power.'6 9
When they have not dismissed cases challenging executive action outright,
courts have often employed the political question doctrine constructively by
finding implicit congressional approval for executive action.'170 In a recent
case, for example, the Sperry Corporation challenged a "user's fee" charged
for partial adjudication before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. The fee was
levied after the corporation had reached an independent settlement with Iran.
The Sperry Corporation claimed that the fee represented an unconstitutional
tax since it had not originated in the House of Representatives. The Court,
theoretically deciding on the merits, found for the Executive. '71
C. Current Weaknesses: Reviewing Acts of Foreign States and Supranationals
Courts have naturally been quite reluctant to review the acts of foreign
states. The act of state doctrine effectively strips American courts of
jurisdiction to review the actions of foreign sovereigns performed outside the
territory of the court's state. 72 Foreign sovereign immunity fulfills a similar
function for acts performed within the United States. Under the act of state
doctrine, American courts do not review such cases on the merits. The rule
167. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944). However, even the use of the constructive version is rare. Generally, the courts simply invoke the
political question doctrine. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); United States v. Uhl,
137 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1943).
168. Some commentators have argued that by reviewing Executive action, the Supreme Court
reinforces separation of powers. See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 155. This argument is faulty, though, in
that it fails to consider whether the structural division of powers has changed after judicial review. By
deciding cases in favor of the Executive, the judiciary concretizes a new division of powers, one that often
reflects a strengthening of the Executive role vis-h-vis the other branches.
169. See, e.g., Algonquin SNG, Inc. v. Federal Energy Admin., 518 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
rev'd, 426 U.S. 548 (1976).
170. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (Ist Cir. 1971); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302
(2d Cir. 1970) (denying congressperson's standing to challenge executive order). Courts that have gone
beyond such formal inquiries have faced reversal. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553
(E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974) (same).
171. United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52 (1989).
172. See Joesph W. Dellapenna, Deciphering the Act of State Doctrine, 35 VILL. L. REV. 1, 125
(1990).
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is informed by the rationale that American courts are not the most appropriate
place to review the acts of foreign governments. 73 Underlying this deference
is respect for foreign sovereignty. The doctrine acts as a conflict of laws rule
generating results similar to those of the political question doctrine. Common
concerns underlie both doctrines, particularly the potential embarrassment
associated with conflicting pronouncements. 74
In Sabbatino,17s plaintiffs argued that the Cuban government had
violated international law by expropriating sugar that had belonged to their
company after the overthrow of Batista. They claimed that this violation
superseded the act of state doctrine by allowing an American court to transfer
title to sugar that had been transported to the United States after the
expropriation. The district and appeals courts sustained the plaintiffs'
claim.176 The Supreme Court reversed,"7 holding that American courts are
not the appropriate forum for resolution of disputes with foreign governments.
The Court noted that the plaintiff could petition the political branches for
intercession with the foreign sovereign if an action in the courts of the foreign
country proved impracticable. The Court held that the doctrine has
"constitutional" underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of
government in a system of separation of powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar
institutions to make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of international
relations. The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the
Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of
state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and the
community of nations as a whole in the international sphere.
178
The act of state doctrine, then, allows courts to defer to foreign
sovereigns just as they defer to the political branches of the American
government. The judiciary has determined that challenges by American
citizens to acts of foreign sovereigns in their sovereign territory should be
made through the political branches of the American government, if not
through direct petition to the appropriate institutions of the foreign state.
Thus, in practice, given the predominant role played by the executive branch
in foreign policy, the doctrine serves as an additional mechanism that courts
use to defer to the executive. In accordance with the judicial reasoning
supporting the doctrine, limitations have been imposed on the doctrine not by
the courts, but by the political branches.' 79
Foreign sovereign immunity plays a similar role in actions within the
United States against foreign sovereigns. The immunity granted by American
courts arises not only from notions of comity and egalitarianism among
sovereign states, but also from judicial concern about the appropriate forum
173. But see Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 705 n.18 (1976).
174. See id. at 705 n.18; see also Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853).
175. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
176. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), af'd, 307 F.2d 845
(2d Cir. 1962).
177. 376 U.S. at 399.
178. Id. at 423.
179. Legislation limited the decision in Sabbatino by requiring the judiciary to disregard the act of
state doctrine in cases where foreign sovereigns have confiscated property in violation of international law.
Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d)(2), 78 Stat. 1009 (1964) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1988)).
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for such claims. While it is recognized that the nexus with American interests
is much stronger in such cases, the courts have held that such claims, because
they implicate foreign affairs, should find their solution in the executive
branch.80 Just as with the act of state doctrine, limitation of the sovereign
immunity doctrine has originated with the political branches rather than the
judiciary.' The current state of the doctrine, in place since the adoption of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 82 immunizes the public acts of
foreign states while allowing adjudication of claims arising from commercial
transactions involving foreign states or their instrumentalities. The Supreme
Court has upheld and implemented the Act.' Thus, in most of their
noncommercial public acts foreign states enjoy immunity from judicial
prosecution in the United States.
What about the case of supranational organizations? While Reid v. Covert
indicates some of the potential pitfalls of a treaty that obviously goes beyond
the scope of the Constitution, it does not address the role of the Constitution
in limiting the actions of supranational bodies. In Hirota v. MacArthur,'
several members of the imperial Japanese government contested the
adjudicatory rights of a military tribunal. The Court held that "the tribunal
sentencing these petitioners is not a tribunal of the United States.... Under
the foregoing circumstances the courts of the United States have no power or
authority to review, to affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and sentences
imposed on these petitioners."185
While the tribunal had not necessarily exercised or threatened to exercise
any unconstitutional power, the Court's determination that it lacked authority
to review the legitimacy of the tribunal raises serious questions about the
potential role of the judiciary in reviewing cessions of sovereign competences
and the exercise of powers by supranational entities. Justice Douglas, in a
concurring oppinion, highlighted some of the difficulties created by the
Court's reasoning. Among his concerns were lack of access to constitutional
protections limiting judicial review by international judicial entities,
constructive sanction of extraconstitutional powers for American officials
acting abroad, and refusal by the Court to review the constitutionality of the
actions of American officials in authorizing American participation in the
tribunal.
While Justice Douglas described the tribunal as "dominated by American
influence," he conceded that was "nonetheless international in character." 86
Justice Douglas seemed to recognize that the majority might be correct in
holding that the Court had no authority to review the decisions of the tribunal.
180. The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11. U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812) (Marshall, C.J.).
181. See, e.g., DEP'T OF STATE, CHANGED POLICY CONCERNING THE GRANTING OF SOVEREIGN
bIMuNrTY TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
182. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4),
1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1988)). On commercial transaction exception see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2); see,
e.g., DeSanchez v. Banco Central de Nicar., 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
183. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
184. 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
185. Id. at 198.
186. Id. at 207.
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Nonetheless, as Douglas argued, some form of check was necessary;
otherwise, the Court's reasoning would leave "practically no room for judicial
scrutiny of this new type of military tribunal which is evolving."" 7 Just as
the Court's reasoning left little room for review of the new type of military
tribunal, the Court leaves no room for review of the new types of
supranational entities and their adjudicative bodies.
D. Recent Cases and Their Implications
Many recently formed international organizations exhibit supranational
characteristics, such as judiciaries with enforcement powers. Among recently
formed organizations, the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement
features binational panels that serve as dispute resolution mechanisms.' 8
U.S. courts cannot review the decisions of these panels on the merits." 9 The
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) features similar panels,
with additional scope to adjudicate labor and environmental disputes.19 In
addition, NAFTA features a novel mechanism for responding to amendments
to member states' trade law. This mechanism seeks, in part, to minimize the
impact of postenactment statutory amendments to U.S. law affecting the
character of NAFTA obligations. Under the system created within NAFTA,
parties objecting to proposed amendments to existing domestic trade law have
the right to obtain a declaratory judgment regarding the compatibility of any
such amendment with existing trade regimes, such as the GATT antidumping
code and NAFTA itself. If the panel declares the proposed amendment
incompatible, the other parties may suspend their application of NAFTA, or
amend their own domestic trade laws.' 9 ' Under both agreements, panels
displace the jurisdiction previously exercised by Article IIn courts over
antidumping and countervailing duties cases. Under the recently completed
Uruguay Round, GATT members have agreed to the creation of a World
Trade Organization (WTO) that has exclusive jurisdiction over trade disputes
and the power to "fine" countries not complying with judgments by
authorizing injured trade partners to raise tariffs. What are the implications
of such powers and how do they function?
The major implication is a shift in power from the legislative and judicial
branches to the executive. Once a treaty delegating competences to a
supranational organization comes into effect, the legislative branch loses any
meaningful role. Withdrawing from the organization remains as a technical
187. Id. at 204.
188. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, ch. 19, 27 I.L.M.
281 (establishing "Binational Panel Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases");
NAFTA Worker Security Act, tit. IV, 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1996 Supp.); Exec. Order No. 12,662, 54 Fed.
Reg. 785 (1989) (implementing United States-Canada Free Trade Implementation Act).
189. For a detailed discussion of the binational panels under the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, see Patricia Kelmar, Note, Binational Panels of the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement in Action: The Constitutional Challenge Continues, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 173
(1993).
190. For a detailed discussion of the NAFTA panels, see Demetrios G. Metropoulbs, Constitutional
Dimensions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 141 (1994).
191. Id. at 148-49.
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option, but not as a practical power. And Congress cannot change the
character of the organization, since such changes require the approval of all
member states. Negotiation becomes the major tool to effect change. The
executive branch, which negotiates with foreign states, therefore plays a
dominant role. In the case of adverse rulings by a supranational dispute panel,
the executive can negotiate with the winning parties to mitigate the effects of
a ruling. Similarly, the negotiating process associated with changing the
character of a supranational organization lies with the executive.
Like the legislative branch, the judiciary has a potential power. Unlike the
legislative branch, it may exercise the power fairly easily. Implementing laws
that prevent the judiciary from reviewing decisions reached by supranational
adjudicative mechanisms on the merits can be declared unconstitutional. The
judiciary must only choose not to invoke the doctrines limiting judicial review.
More importantly, the judiciary can monitor a supranational to ensure it is not
exercising powers beyond those delegated by the United States. This, of
course, would also require the judiciary to reject those doctrines it
traditionally invokes to avoid review. Some recent cases illustrate the
ramifications of these issues.
1. WTO Rejection of Clean Air Act
On January 17, 1996, a WTO panel reached an historic decision: that the
United States Clean Air Act, which includes differing emissions standards for
domestic and imported gasoline, violates the GATT rules enforced by the
WTO because it discriminates against imported gasoline.'92 Why should this
be considered historic? After. all, the GATT itself had reached a similar
decision about the effects of the CAFE fuel economy requirements on
imported automobiles. The decision marks the first time that the WTO has
exercised its supranational power, and furthermore, exercised it against the
world's most powerful state.
Venezuela, one of the world's largest gasoline exporters through its
parastatal Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. and the locally based Citgo Petroleum
Corp., joined by Brazil, complained that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) rule on reformulated gasoline applied different baseline standards for
foreign and domestic refiners as dictated by the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990 (CAAA).' 93
The CAAA contains two sets of requirements for refiners. The first,
concerning benzene, oxygenate content, and vapor pressure, includes strict
standards uniform to all refiners; the second, concerning sulfur, aromatics,
and olefin content, allows domestic reformulated gas refiners to meet their
own 1990 baseline averages for the period 1995-1997, while requiring
imported reformulated gas refiners to meet the 1990 domestic industry average
for nonattainment areas. After 1997, domestic producers will face the same
standard regardless of their previous baselines.
192. United States Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 274 (World
Trade Org. Arb. Panel 1996); see The Energy Rep., Dec. 25, 1995, at 1009.
193. The following description is derived largely from The Energy Report, Jan. 22, 1996.
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When Venezuela complained to the EPA in 1994 and threatened to make
a complaint to the GATT, the EPA proposed a rule change allowing foreign
as well as domestic refiners to use individual baselines until 1997. Some
members of Congress accused the Clinton Administration of caving in to
foreign pressure to avoid a GATT challenge during the final considerations
of the Uruguay Round. Exercising the spending power, Congress denied the
EPA the funds necessary to implement the rule in August 1994. 94
Venezuela reacted by filing a GATT complaint, which was shifted to the
WTO when it came into existence in January 1995. Venezuela alleged losses
of $150 million per year. Brazil joined the petition, and Norway and the
European Union were listed as interested third parties."95
In its ruling, the WTO ordered the U.S. to change the Clean Air Act to
eliminate the discrimination against imported gasoline. Theoretically, the
United States can ignore the order, vitiating any legal effect. But if the United
States does not accept the ruling by changing the Clean Air Act, the United
States could face substantial fines set by the WTO of approximately $150
million 96 in the form .of retaliatory tariffs of injured countries, in this case
Venezuela and Brazil.
If a country does not appeal a ruling, the decision comes into effect after
sixty days. If a country appeals, the process can take up to eighteen months,
but the country must then accept the appellate ruling as final and binding. The
United States decided to appeal.'97 If the United States loses the appeal, it
will have to modify the Clean Air Act or face retaliatory sanctions. The
process can only be stopped by a consensus of the one hundred twenty WTO
members or by a settlement between the parties to the dispute.
Congress has a right to demand a domestic review of the case under the
U.S. law implementing the final agreement of the Uruguay Round creating the
WTO. This review, however, can only achieve two results besides acceptance
of the WTO ruling: the political result of criticizing the executive branch or
the legislative result of withdrawing from the WTO. Because of its extreme
nature, the latter is unlikely to occur. The Clean Air ruling shows for the first
time the United States' acceptance of being subject to supranational law.
2. United States-Mexico Tuna Dispute Under GAYT
During the 1980s, the United States was embroiled in a dispute with
Mexico and the GATT over a U.S. decision to ban tuna imports from
Mexico. The American government issued the ban ostensibly to prevent
Mexican fishermen from exporting to the United States tuna caught in driftnets
that snare and kill thosands of dolphins. The United States, seeking as a policy
matter to protect dolphins, had banned the domestic use of similar nets.
Regardless of whether the United States should try to influence Mexican
policy, allowing continued tuna imports from Mexico would constitute
194. The Energy Rep., Aug. 8,1994, at 528.
195. The Energy Rep., Apr. 17, 1995, at 315.
196. Norman Solomon, Pollution Law Silently Dumped, CAP. TIMEs, Feb. 12, 1996, at 2C (quoting
Lori Wallach, Director of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch).
197. U.S. to Appeal a Ruling on Imported Gasoline, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 1996, at B10.
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environmental dumping, increasing pressures on American fishermen to revert
to the less costly driftnet method while reducing the" share of the American
market enjoyed by American fishermen.
Mexico lodged a complaint with GATT. Two GATT panels held in
Mexico's favor. Rancor between the United States, Mexico, and the GATT
dissipated as the United States complied with the ruling after obtaining
Mexican assurances that Mexican fishermen would replace driftnets with more
expensive fishing methods compatible with dolphin preservation. But is this
really practicable as a paradigm? GATT rules do not include provisions
allowing import restrictions to compensate for environmental or social
dumping. The GATT panel was justified in its decision. At the same time, the
United States has legitimate policy concerns that may encompass areas outside
of the multilateral GATT agreement, such as the prevention of environmental
and social dumping.
Under GATT rules, American courts cannot review GATT panel
decisions on the merits. As long as the GATT had no enforcement power, the
United States could unilaterally refuse to comply with decisions with relatively
minor consequences. Under the WTO the United States has less leeway to
object to decisions.
3. Constitutionality of Binational Panels
In 1993, a group called National Council for Industrial Defense, Inc. filed
suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that the
binational panels established under chapter 19 of the United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) were unconstitutional. The court dismissed the
case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, refusing to rule on the
merits. 9 '
Although the court did not rule on the ultimate issue - the
constitutionality of the panels - the FTA does raise a number of interesting
constitutional issues. Under the Agreement, either national party may elect to
opt out from judicial review in national courts and adjudicate claims before
a panel of five members. 199 Panel members are chosen from a list of fifty
eligible panelists, with each country selecting half of the members. While only
the two national parties may elect to invoke the panel procedure, panel
decisions are binding on all affected parties, including private parties.
It is slightly misleading to suggest that Congress gave the judiciary
complete jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of the panels. Aside from
the restricted judicial venue available for such challenges (the D.C. Circuit)
the Implementation Act contains provisions limiting judicial jurisidiction to
. 198. National Council for Indus. Defense, Inc. v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 794 (D.D.C. 1993).
Pursuant to the Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(g)(4)(A), challenges to the constitutionality of
the FTA "may be brought in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit."
The court ruled that the language of the statute conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the D.C. Circuit.
Plaintiffs did not seek review of the decision or file anew in the D.C. Circuit.
199. The panel system of NAFTA is based in large part on this prior system. The discussion
accordingly limits itself to the FTA panel structure in lieu of describing the NAFTA panel system in detail
as well.
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review the constitutionality of the panels.2' Possibly foreseeing that the
judiciary might declare the panels unconstitutional, Congress authorized the
President to issue Executive Order 12,662 by providing that
in such event, the President is authorized on behalf of the United States to accept, as a
whole, the decision of a binational panel or extraordinary challenge committee remanding
the determination to the administering authority or the Commission within the period
specified by the panel or committee .... and no court of the United States shall have power
or jurisdiction to review such action .... 201
Thus, the Implementation Act and the Executive Order attempt to preclude
judicial review by proscribing any judicial opinion finding the binational panel
structure unconstitutional.
In conjunction with this provision, chapter 19 provides that only interested
parties may challenge panel decisions and requires that such challenges be
filed within thirty days of the final decision. Absent claims concerning the
constitutionality of decisions, for which limited judicial review is available,
no judicial review is permitted.
E. Constitutional Implications: Article III
The powers of WTO and NAFTA panels may raise heated challenges on
policy grounds. These panels also raise more fundamental questions about our
constitutional order.
Private parties in the United States have recourse to American courts to
enforce GATT provisions, in so far as Congress enacts into law GATT
agreements such as the Uruguay Round. At the same time, private parties do
not have recourse to American courts to challenge the actions of another
country. Such actions must be measured by the laws of that country in its own
courts. Under GATT (and WTO) rules, only a national party can bring such
a complaint. At least one significant difficulty arises from this process. Private
parties in the United States can legitimately rely on American statutes and
their judicial interpretation. What would happen if a GATT/WTO panel
interpreted some tariff provision more broadly than the political or judicial
branches of the United States? If a private pariy had contracted to import
certain goods in accordance with the preexisting American interpretation, the
GATT/WTO ruling would result in a higher tariff, tantamount to a tax. The
private party, however, would not be able to challenge the GATT/WTO ruling
because private party challenges are not available within the GATT/WTO
structure and United States courts would have no jurisdiction to review the
GATT/WTO decision. The United States-Canada FTA raises similar
difficulties of legitimate expectations created by law.
Clearly, "additional or substitute procedural safeguards" would go some
way to alleviating this problem. Fiscal and administrative burdens on the
government would be relatively small. Courts might not review such cases
anyway, insofar as the government interest involved relates to foreign affairs.
200. Naturally, a court could review the jurisdictional limits independently of the constitutionality
of the binational panels.
201. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7)(B) (1994).
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Considerations of comity, however, are strange when national governments
claim that international organizations are neither supranational nor sovereign
and when alternative procedures may be built into the WTO at relatively little
cost.
There are at least two important distinctions that cast graver doubts on the
constitutionality of the FTA/NAFTA panels under Article III than on the
constitutionality of the GATT/WTO panels. First, Congress and the President
have only delegated jurisdiction to international tribunals to hear disputes
between countries. Whether these disputes concerned national boundaries"'
or conflicts over control of fisheries, the disputes have been inherently
international. Despite being an international agreement, the FTA codifies
import duties - an area entirely dependent on legislation of the importing
country. Second, and directly underpinning the first distinction, the FTA
directs panel members to decide disputes "in accordance with the
countervailing duty law of the importing party." Thus, panels necessarily
apply and interpret American law. The delegation of such powers may disturb
the balance of separated powers established by the Constitution.
Article III, § 1 provides that
The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges... shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour ....
These broad requirements must be met in order for a tribunal to qualify
as an Article Il1 court.2 3 Neither requirement is met by the FTA panels.
Panel decisions may not be reviewed on the merits by the Supreme Court, nor
do panel members enjoy life tenure "during good Behaviour."" The panels
are not "inferior Courts" for purposes of Article III. Apparently, if the
Constitution requires that the panels be constituted as Article III courts, they
are per se structurally unconstitutional.
However, one cannot simply conclude that the panels are therefore
unconstitutional. One must first determine whether the Constitution requires
that the panels be constituted as Article III courts. If the Constitution does not
so require, one must assess whether the panels are otherwise incompatible
with Article III. Resolving the compatibility of the FTA panels with Article
III is somewhat difficult given Supreme Court jurisprudence on the topic,
which recognizes that under Article I Congress may form adjudicative bodies
called legislative courts.2 5 The Supreme Court has upheld delegation of
subject matter capable of adjudication by Article III tribunals to non-Article
II tribunals in certain situations. In such situations, the Court has further
suggested certain conditions that must be satisfied for delegation to occur.
202. See, e.g., Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1197 (1984).
203. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1961), reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 854 (1962).
204. Lack of tenure impairs judicial independence, violating the "right to have claims decided before
judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government." United States v. Will,
449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980).
205. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.) (upholding
congressional creation of non-Article III "courts" in a territory). I use the term "Article I" here for the
sake of convenience. Congress may form courts under Article IV as well.
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1. Should the FTA panels be Article III courts?
The history of customs adjudication does not provide especially clear
guidelines for determining whether customs law is a subject area properly
within the exclusive jurisdiction of Article III courts. Until 1962, the Supreme
Court explicitly held that the Court of Claims, the predecessor to the Court
of International Trade exercising jurisdiction over customs claims, was a court
created under the legislative power of Article I.2' Responding to legislative
action declaring the court an Article III court, the Supreme Court held in 1962
that the Court of Claims was indeed an Article I court.2 7 As a result,
FTA panels, in applying American customs law, act in the traditional province
of an Article m court. This application of American customs law is not
unconstitutional, as a non-Article III court may consider matters susceptible
to resolution by Article M courts. Article III courts may discharge limited
duties outside of their Article Im writ.2"' While distinctions between public
rights and private privileges may no longer be wholly reliable,
[t]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that thejudicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial
determination, but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts
of the United States, as it may deem proper.201
If the analysis were limited to this reasoning, customs and international trade
law might fit within the category of cases that may be adjudicated by
non-Article III tribunals. Still, important private rights are clearly implicated,
such as reliance on tariff levels under existing customs and trade law, as well
as the legitimate expectation that decisions binding against private parties will
be made in accordance with applicable law in a nonarbitrary fashion.
More recent Supreme Court opinions defining the boundaries of Article
III jurisdiction are less supportive to those wishing to constitute FTA panels
outside of Article M. In 1982, Justice Brennan argued in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. that causes of action recognized
at law or in equity during the preconstitutional period require adjudication
only by Article Im courts because the' are at the "protected core" of the
judicial power of Article III.21° In order for the panels to conform with the
Constitution, current Supreme Court jurisprudence seems to mandate some
review on the merits of FTA/NAFTA panel decisions by Article III
courts. 2 "
206. Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 581 (1933); Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438,
458-59 (1929).
207. Glidden Co., 370 U.S. at 530.
208. Certainly the status of a district court or court of appeals would not be altered by a mere
congressional attemptto invest it with insignificant nonjudicial business; it would be equally perverse to
make the status of these courts turn upon so minuscule a portion of their purported functions. Glidden Co.,
370 U.S. at 583.
209. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855).
210. 458 U.S. at 71 n.25 (1982) (plurality opinion).
211. The additional fact that these cases were often decided by juries raises the possibility that
actions at common law involving customs matters would survive the elimination of statutory causes of
action under Amendment VII to the Constitution which provides that in "[s]uits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." U.S.
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2. Conditions Attaching to Delegation to Non-Article X11 Tribunals
Some of the same opinions elaborating a protected core of actions residing
exclusively within Article I also suggest that, regardless of whether the FTA
panels constitutionally enjoy original jurisidiction, their decisions must be
subject to at least some review by Article III courts.212 This position is
supported by a growing number of scholars. t3 The due process concerns
previously discussed are reinforced by the systemic value of judicial review
as a structural component of separation of powers.
The Thomas Court, after suggesting that "no unwilling defendant" was
likely to become the subject of judicial enforcement of the legislation in
question,214 upheld a mandatory arbitration scheme subject to very limited
judicial review. The Court based this finding, at least in part, on the ability
of private parties to challenge arbitral findings and determinations for fraud,
misconduct, or misrepresentation, a right guaranteed by the legislation. The
Court found that "[t]his provision protects against arbitrators who abuse or
exceed their powers or willfully misconstrue their mandate under the
governing law. "215 In addition, the Court noted that "it is sufficient to note
that [the Act] does provide for limited Article III review, including whatever
review is independently required by due process considerations. "216
While the Court has avoided formulaic treatment of these issues, it has
elaborated several nonexclusive factors to consider. In Schor, the Court listed
four factors to consider in judging the constitutionality of statutory delegation
to non-Article I tribunals and the constitutionality of the adjudicative process
itself:
the extent to which the essential attributes of judicial power are reserved to Article III
courts, and the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range ofjurisdiction
and powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and importance of the
rights to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the
requirements of Article 111.217
In its application of these factors, the Court found that while the CFTC could
hear ancillary counterclaims, which is uncommon in agency adjudication, the
CFTC enjoyed jurisdiction only over a "particularized area of law"" 8 and
its decisions were subject both to review on the facts and de novo review on
questions of law.21 9
CONST. amend. VII. The Supreme Court has held that the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to trial
by jury when it existed at common law. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1973).
212. This is not to suggest that the debate between those who think FTA decisions should be subject
to Art. III review and those who think that it should not is necessarily of recent vintage. Some older cases
are cited frequently for the same proposition, particularly Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
213. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative
Courts Under Article Iff, 65 IND. L.J. 233 (1990); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies, and Article 111, 101 HARV. L. REV. 916 (1988).
214. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 473 U.S. 568, 591 (1985).
215. Id. at 592.
216. Id. at 593.
217. Commodity Futuies Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 883, 851.
218. Id. (citing Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85 (1982)).
219. See id. at 853.
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Based on this line of reasoning, the constitutionality of the FTA panels
is highly questionable. Congress has delegated power over a broader area of
law than was at issue in Schor, a case in which the Court emphasized the
scope of delegated power as an important factor to consider. More
importantly, within the jurisdiction of the panels as delegated by Congress,
Article I courts have no power 6f judicial review. Whether Congress can
completely exclude Article III courts from judicial review of customs law
presents a question of first impression. Givei the important private rights at
issue, the delegation. of power in this case, which excludes judicial review
completely, seems overly broad and unconstitutional.
3. Actual Performance of the FTA Panels
Under chapter 19, the FTA panels are supposed to apply American law
as interpreted by American courts. Although panel decisions are not binding
legal precedent, the decisions have ramifications on private parties in the
United States. Panel decisions that diverge from American legal standards
may result in interpretations and applications of American law that differ from
those rendered by the federal courts. This situation is particularly dangerous
when American courts cannot review the legal conclusions of the panels.
In Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada,22 a panel overturned
a decision by the International Trade Commission finding that American pork
producers had been injured by imports of subsidized Canadian pork. After two
remands, Commissioners Rohr and Newquist wrote that the panel had adopted
a standard of review of agency decisions not applicable under American
law,"1 and that the panel had not applied standards required by relevant
statutes, so that the decision acted sub silentio to overrule existing federal law
and the FrA.m
The United States National Pork Council brought a later case that resulted
in an adverse decision. In dissent, the chairperson stated that, "[iln
overturning Commerce's interpretation of the law, the panel has produced a
decision that is plainly wrong and remarkably insensitive to U.S. law."223
Moreover, the chairperson asserted that:
The panel shows no recognition of the limitations imposed by United States law on
reviewing bodies confronted with a highly technical, fact-intensive record and no
consideration of the impact of its decision on the binational process. While panel decisions
are not binding on United States courts, they do influence other binational panels; if given
precedential respect by other panels, this panel's decision would cause a fundamental change
in the way United States countervailing duty law is administered in cases involving Canadian
products.Y
220. Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Pork from Canada (U.S. v. Can.), USA-89-1904-06, (U.S.-Can.
FTA Binational Panel Rev. 1990), reprinted in I NAFTA: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (James R. Holen &
Donald J. Musch eds., 1995).
221. Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Pork from Canada, USITC Pub. 2362, Inv. No. 701-TA-298
(Final), at 5 (Feb. 1991).
222. Id. at 6, 8-9.
223. Live Swine from Canada (U.S. v. Can.), USA-91-1904-03, at 39 (Binational Panel Rev.
U.S.-Can. FTA, 1992), reprinted in 1 NAFTA: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT supra note 220.
224. Id. at 40 (footnote omitted).
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The chairperson's dissent, however, may be extreme. While the
Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECC), which convened on application
of the United States Trade Representative and Department of Commerce, did
suggest that it disagreed with the actual conclusion reached by the panel on
the merits,' the committee, unlike the chairperson, emphasized that the
panel had employed the appropriate standard of review, namely the standard
for review of agency decisions established by Chevron226  and its
progeny. 7
Generally, panel decisions have been very sensitive to U.S. law. Most
panel decisions have been transparent, beginning with recitation of statutory
authority and moving on to case law establishing the appropriate standard for
review based on statute.228 The panels have rigorously applied the standards
developed by the Court of International Trade, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court.
4. Conclusion
Laying aside the issue of how well the panels have functioned, the
structure of the panels and the lack of substantive review of panel decisions
raise serious constitutional questions. The FTA's experience with panel
decisionmaking in Live Swine is troubling. As the ECC stated in that case:
"[The ECC] . . . does not serve as. an ordinary appellate court. . . .The
ECC should address systemic problems and not mere legal issues that do not
threaten the integrity of the FTA's dispute resolution mechanism itself."229
The FIA crafted a reasonable role for the ECC. The lack of judicial
review of the panels' decisions, however, allows arbitrary and erroneous
decisions to stand. Litigants may therefore be deprived of the equal protection
of the laws, and denied legitimate expectations derived from applicable
American statutes and jurisprudence.
It would appear that the jurisdiction of the panels, arising as it does from
preexisting common law rights of action affecting private parties, properly
belongs to an Article III court. Even if delegation to a non-Article III court
is acceptable, the complete lack of judicial reviev that distinguishes the panels
renders their constitutionality dubious. The unique character of the FTA
panels reinforces these conclusions. As extragovernmental entities, the panels
are subject to less rigorous oversight from the political and judicial branches,
particularly since the Canadian government appoints half of the panelists. As
part of an international agency outside the control of the American
government, the panels may be subject to political pressures from the
225. Live Swine from Canada (U.S. v. Can.), ECC-93-1904-01USA, (U.S.-Can. FTA Binational
Panel Rev. 1993), reprinted in 1 NAFTA: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 220.
226. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
227. It must also be emphasized that the U.S. Trade Representative waived his right to appeal two
issues by failing to include them in his brief. See Live Swine, ECC-93-1904-01USA, at 2.
228. See, e.g., In re Softwood Lumber from Canada (U.S. v. Can.), USA-92-1904-02, at 2-6
(U.S.-Can. FTA Binational Panel Rev. 1994), reprinted in 1 NAFTA: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note
220. Pure and Alloy Magnesium from Canada (U.S. v. Can.), USA-92-1904-03, 2-6 (U.S.-Can. FTA
Binational Panel Rev., Aug. 16, 1993), reprinted in I NAFTA: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 220.
229. Live Swine, ECC-93-1904-01USA, at 2-3.
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executive branch, especially because panelists serve a limited term and are
drawn from a large pool. Moreover, most of the potential panelists in the pool
have strong vested interests; they are often private attorneys who represent
foreign companies and importers of foreign products. 30
The political branch's attempt to circumvent a judicial determination of
the unconstitutionality of the panel structure is itself an unconstitutional
aggrandizement of. executive power. Executive Order 12,662 and the
Implementation Act itself,"3 which extend the scope of the political branch's
powers at the expense of the judiciary, impair the ability of the judiciary to
enforce constitutional norms and to fulfill its coequal role as a check on the
powers of the other branches. 3 2
V. DEVELOPING CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR SUPRANATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: LESSONS FROM GERMANY
Since World War II, a new set of supranational international institutions
has developed. Over time, more and more countries have found themselves
subject to the power of these organizations - some willingly, as in the case
of the members of the European Union, and others less willingly, as in the
case of. developing countries with regard to the IMF. Until recently, the
United States had never been fully subject to the power of supranational
organizations. The United States has acted on behalf of, or in concert with,
supranational organizations, but rarely has been acted upon.
As the United States integrates into supranational trade bodies such as the
NAFTA and the WTO, however, that situation will continue to change. The
United States now finds itself subject to the authority of supranational
organizations with their own decisionmaking and enforcement powers.
Unfortunately, the American constitutional order has not adjusted to this new
reality. On the other hand, Germany has extensive experience with the
constitutional issues faced by a federal state integrating into a supranational
organization. For more than forty years, Germany has been a central player
in the development of what is now the European Union.
The primary concern of this Article is the extent to which branches of the
United States government can delegate their legal competences to international
or supranational organizations. One case examined was that of the WTO.
Given its broad enforcement powers, the WTO assumes judicial functions. Do
the political branches have the authority to delegate important judicial tasks
to an international organization like the WTO?
The absence of clear jurisprudential guidance on the delegation issue
makes this question difficult. Commentary on the issue mirrors in many
respects the concerns voiced by the BVG in its Maastricht decision. In
addition to concerns about separation of powers and individual rights, there
230. Telephone interview with Donald R. Dinan, counsel for National Council for Industrial
Defense, Inc. (on file with author).
231. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)-(g)(7)(B) (1994).
232. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam).
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is the question of whether such supranational bodies would enjoy legitimacy
through compliance with the "democracy principle."
The BVG test of legitimacy requires that the EU's legislative authority be
derived either from the popularly elected parliaments of the member states or
from the elected European Parliament. In discussing delegation of legislative
functions to agencies, the following arguments echo the BVG test:
In general, limits on congressional capacity to delegate responsibility derive from the
implicit constitutional requirements of consensual government under law. Under any theory
that finds legitimacy in the supposed consent of the governed within a framework of
constitutional limitations, the cooperative exercise of accountable power presupposes the
possibility of tracing every such exercise to a choice made by one of the 'representative'
branches, a choice for which someone can be held both politically and legally
responsible.
3
Are these requirements met when powers are delegated to international bodies
largely outside the political and legal control of the United States and its
citizens?
This part of the Article explores some of the issues faced by Germany
- issues that already confront the United States or are likely to confront it in
the future - and examines how Germany has addressed them. By comparing
the German strategies with the ways in which the U.S. constitutional order
currently reacts to these issues, we can develop a better understanding of the
weaknesses in the present American approach, and suggest possible solutions
to some of these problems.
A. Separation of Powers
How the three branches of government participate in a decision to cede
sovereign competences to a supranational organization is an important
threshold question. In Germany, each branch participates in the decision.
First, the executive branch sets a policy goal of ceding a sovereign
competence. The legislative branch must then draft a bill that would
implement the delegation. At this stage, a party with standing, typically a
legislator, may ask the constitutional court, the BVG, to examine the bill to
determine its constitutionality. When the BVG is invoked, the parliament
usually holds the bill pending decision by the BVG so that any necessary
changes can be made or so that the bill may be stopped before passage if
deemed unconstitutional.
In the United States, a similar process occurs. The executive negotiated
a treaty, which is then usually implemented in the form of a statute passed
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The judiciary may participate after
passage of the implementing statute, but only if the statute is challenged as
unconstitutional.
Thus, in the initial decisionmaking process, there is one obvious
difference between the German and American systems. The German judiciary
plays a much more active policy role by issuing declaratory judgments. The
American judiciary, on the other hand, plays a more reactive role, stepping
233. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 286 (1978).
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in only after a statute has been passed. Absent any additional information, it
is difficult to weigh the relative merits of each. The German process
maximizes legislative efficiency (the legislature does not perform unnecessary
work) while the American process maximizes judicial efficiency (the judicial
caseload is restricted).
One important piece of additional information is the extent to which the
judiciary can monitor the effects of ceding competences to a supranational
organization. In Germany, the BVG plays a critical role in both evaluating the
process at its initial stages and monitoring the effects of ceding competences
over time.
When evaluating a cession of sovereign competences, the BVG performs
a comprehensive analysis of both procedural requirements and the likely
effects on ihe German constitutional order. In the Maastricht decision, for
example, the BVG stressed the importance of the legislative branch's role in
ceding sovereign competences. Not only must the legislature pass a statute,
but the statute must set out in detail exactly what competences are being
ceded. Absent such detail, the statute would fail to meet the minimum
standard the German constitution requires. This requirement achieves two
goals. First, both the legislature and judiciary participate in the process to the
extent constitutionally mandated. Second, by requiring a detailed statute, the
BVG ensures that it can monitor the actions of the supranational organization,
thereby verifying that the supranational organization is acting within the limits
of the competence delegated by Germany. Because the BVG itself interprets
the domestic implementing statute, the BVG does not exceed the scope of its
jurisdiction, while at the same time it ensures that its jurisdiction is
unrestricted. Rather than demanding that the European Union or its institutions
act in a particular way, the BVG is simply ordering the German government
to comply with its decisions. If the European Union or its institutions exercise
powers that the BVG determines to be beyond the scope of the powers
Germany ceded, the German state is not bound by decisions of the European
Union that are based on such powers. Thus, the BVG may order the members
of the executive branch participating in EU governance structures to ignore
or reject such decisions.
In practice, this means that the BVG has the authority to ensure that the
competences held by the European Union do not expand without an
amendment to the Maastricht Treaty. Such an amendment would have to be
implemented through a domestic statute absent a treaty amendment. Through
this doctrine, the BVG ensures the continued participation of all three
branches in ceding sovereign powers, and especially that of the legislative and
judicial branches.
When monitoring the effects of ceding sovereign competences to the
European Union, the BVG also examines other constitutional values. In the
Bayerische Staatsregierung case, for example, the BVG was called upon to
examine whether the structure of German participation in the European Union,
which is highly dependent on the executive branch, impinges upon values of
federalism when the executive is called upon to participate in EU decisions
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regarding matters the German constitution reserves to the German states." 4
In the Maastricht decision, the court went even further in its inquiry by
examining the extent to which the states and the legislative branch could or
should participate in EU institutions. While this inquiry is still inconclusive,
the BVG has ordered or confirmed certain changes in government practice in
this area, including stronger information rights for the states and legislature
as well as legislative and state participation in EU decisionmaking structures
in areas relevant to their constitutionally reserved powers.
The United States does not have the same long experience with ceding
sovereign powers, making the isolation of constitutional doctrine relevant to
the issues generated by ceding sovereign powers difficult. At the same time,
the United States does have constitutional doctrines that will play a central
role absent the development of new doctrine specific to the subject.
Extrapolating from current practice, we can predict how well current U.S.
jurisprudence is likely to protect values associated with the separation of
powers.
The German experience points to two important goals: first, evaluating
decisions to cede sovereign powers at an early stage to ensure that the process
meets constitutional requirements; and second, monitoring supranational
organizations over time to ensure that they do not act outside the scope of the
powers ceded to them. United States constitutional law is gravely devoid in
both areas. In Germany, the BVG requires that any cession of sovereign
competences occur through a detailed statute passed by the legislature. In the
United States, while most delegations of sovereign powers follow a similar
path, the federal judiciary has not explicitly affirmed the process as
mandatory. In fact, the existence of executive agreements, which come into
force without congressional participation, suggests that the current U.S.
constitutional order is weak in the area of ensuring that procedural
requirements are met.
The existence in the United States of a set of doctrines that defer to the
executive branch, especially regarding foreign affairs powers, compounds the
problem. 5 Because of the heightened deference in this area, the Supreme
Court has never defined the exact procedural requirements that must be met.
Consequently, the Court has already allowed the executive branch to become
stronger at the'expense of the legislative aid judicial branches.
Given its limited experience in monitoring, the American judiciary has
much to learn from the German experience. The weakness in the evaluation
process could be remedied by abandoning the judiciary's current practice of
extreme deference to the executive in favor of more active engagement with
the problems engendered by ceding sovereign powers. A necessary starting
point is an explicit exposition of the process required by the Constitution, in
addition to a coherent vision of the minimum sovereign competences the
United States must maintain. The judiciary must also commit itself to
234. Judgment of Apr. 11, 1989, 80 BVerfGE 74 (1989).
235. See Thomas Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992);
Comment, Judicial Deference to Executive Foreign Policy Authority, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 345, 373-71
(1981) (critical review). See generally Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93
COLuM. L. REV. 1 (1993).
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monitoring supranational organizations to ensure that they exercise only those
powers that have been delegated to them, and that they exercise those powers
in a' manner compatible with important constitutional protections and
guarantees.
B. Due process
The BVG discovered relatively quickly that one area of critical
importance in ceding sovereign competences would be divergences between
the guarantees of the domestic constitutional order and the supranational
constitutional order. To the extent that the supranational order exceeded the
requirements of the domestic order, no problems would occur. But given the
different developmental stages of the European Union as a supranational
constitutional order and Germany as a domestic constitutional order, it was
more likely that the guarantees of the EU constitutional order would fail to be
as broad as the guarantees of the German order.
It is this difficulty that lies at the center of the line of cases including
Solange I, Solange II, and the Maastricht decision. The BVG reacted by
developing an evolutionary theory by which to judge the European Union. As
long as the constitutional guarantees of the European Union were not as fully
developed as those of Germany, including such broad elements as a
democratic political structure and guarantees of basic human rights, the BVG
would continue to monitor the European Union. But because the European
Union was an evolving entity, the BVG determined that it would weigh the
weaknesses of the EU constitutional order against the relative strength of the
set of EU competences. As the European Union became stronger it would be
required to augment its constitutional order accordingly, to approach more
nearly the level of constitutional protections achieved in Germany. The United
States has no similar doctrine. As the United States becomes increasingly
integrated, such a doctrine may be highly attractive.
At the same time, the United States must make a more fundamental
decision: To what extent does it desire to cede sovereign powers? The
German doctrine outlined above emerges from a constitutional order that
specifically supports ceding sovereign competences to the European Union.
The U.S. constitutional order has no such predilection. Accordingly, the
United States may need to set a higher standard for supranational
organizations.
While the BVG has been deferential to the growth of the European
Union, the court has always maintained the right to monitor that development.
In the United States, the judiciary should ensure that it plays a similar role.
The structure of the adjudicatory processes in the supranational trade
organizations of which the United States is a member limits the role of federal
courts. The BVG decided that the existence of two separate and exclusive
jurisdictions was not problematic. It agreed to refrain from judging EU law
on the merits, but insisted upon maintaining its jurisdiction over issues of
domestic law, including the scope of powers delegated to the European Union
by the German state.
At a minimum, the U.S. judiciary should follow the German doctrine. In
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the case of the NAFTA and the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement,
areas of U.S. domestic law are applied by binational panels. While these
rulings are not legally binding on U.S. courts, as a practical matter they are
likely to have a profound effect on American jurisprudence. To the extent that
such panels apply U.S. domestic law, federal courts should play a role in
either interpreting the relevant law at the outset or in- instances of appellate
review. Currently, U.S. courts are limited to deciding only the
constitutionality of the panels. If the federal judiciary cannot be invoked to
decide issues of domestic law, the panels should be held unconstitutional. A
better approach, however, would be to alter the adjudicative structure.
In addition to protecting individuals, an important systemic value is
served by judicial review on the merits of decisions reached by supranational
organizations when domestic law is applied. Such a review protects the
judicial branch by ensuring that executive or joint executive-legislative
decisions to cede competences do not weaken the judiciary. Domestic law
includes constitutional values. The judiciary must monitor supranational
organizations to ensure continuing protection of American constitutional
values, regardless of whether areas of substantive domestic law are applied by
the organization.
C. Federalism
While the experience of the BVG demonstrates how effective a
constitutional court can be at protecting constitutional values while
accomodating integration into a supranational organization, the 'experience also
shows that such a process of integration cannot occur without placing
tremendous stress on that constitutional order. In the German case, none of
the three core areas examined here has been perfectly protected, and of the
three, federalism has suffered the most.
As the Bayerische Staatsregierung case shows, there may be a
fundamental conflict between a domestic constitutional order that divides
powers between the national government and its constituent states and a
supranational constitutional order whose powers include some areas
domestically reserved to the federation and some reserved to the states. The
fundamental conflict arises when the domestic states do not participate in the
decisionmaking structures of the supranational entity.
In the Bayerische Staatsregierung case, the BVG erred. 6 Faced with
this conflict, the BVG allowed the existing structure to continue, accepting the
argument that the states would be best protected if the executive represented
their case. But the BVG did not force the executive to vote as a proxy for the
states. By the time of the Maastricht decision, the BVG had considerably
changed its stance. It held not only that the states and legislature must receive
adequate information prior to decisions, but also that, where relevant,
representatives of each body should be allowed to participate in EU
decisionmaking structures. The court, however, has not been able to resolve
the fundamental conflicts because the executive plays the constitutional role
236. Judgment of Apr. 11, 1989, 80 BVerfGE 74.
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of representing the state in foreign affairs and this role is difficult to reconcile
with mandating participation by the states or legislature in EU decisionmaking
structures.
One thing the BVG has refused to recognize is that in many respects the
distinction between "foreign" and "domestic" affairs has become blurred. As
problems become increasingly transnational in nature, supranational
institutions play a greater role. The .EU, NAFTA, and WTO are not foreign
in any real sense. The judiciary should recognize this change and reformulate
its traditional deference to executive branch foreign policymaking. In
particular, the judiciary must consider, on the merits, cases alleging cession
of sovereign powers to international or supranational bodies.
In the United States, federalism does not raise as many problems as in
Germany. The United States is not a strong federal state compared to
Germany where the states do not have any specific powers. At the same time,
protecting the states may become relevant. For instance, the WTO might
declare that the practice of many American states of giving land to new
investors, providing loans on preferential terms, and giving large tax breaks,
violates the GATT subsidies code and order the states to stop such practices.
In such a case, the federal judiciary would have to evaluate whether the WTO
had jurisdiction under the implementing legislation to order the states to act
and whether the substance of such an order would be valid when the practice
is legal in the United States. The U.S. Constitution may limit the federal
government in its ability to order the states to act. 7 By monitoring the
supranational organization, the federal judiciary would be able to serve
federalist values, and ensure adequate separation of powers and due process.
D. General Concerns
In the battle between the German constitutional emphasis on legislative
efficiency and the American emphasis on judicial efficiency, which approach
should prevail? When sovereign competences are ceded, the German approach
is more effective. While the effectiveness of a constitutional court inevitably
will depend on a wide range of factors, two elements of the BVG's
jurisprudence lie at the heart of Germany's strength in this area: declaratory
judgments and a willingness to confront the executive branch.
By issuing declaratory judgments on the constitutionality of a proposed
cession of sovereign power, the BVG makes the legislature more efficient and
maximizes judicial impact. While it may be forced to hear more cases, the
BVG ensures that its voice will be heard and heeded early on, allowing it to
suggest small changes that facilitate the constitutionality of a cession of
sovereign competences. On the other hand, the American approach, which
lacks these two advantages, generates two negative incentives. First, if a
statute ceding sovereign competences has real, but minor flaws, the federal
judiciary may be less likely to declare it unconstitutional. Because the role of
U.S. courts is to decide cases rather than give advice, they are less likely to
have as substantial an impact on crafting an acceptable alternative (even if the
237. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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courts declare a statute unconstitutional). Accordingly, the German approach
may result in a more flexible relationship with a supranational organization,
one in which the courts play a supervisory role and accept the evolution of a
supranational entity by applying different standards over time.
The second negative incentive stems from the extreme deference of the
U.S. judiciary to the executive, virtually guaranteeing the continued
strengthening of the executive at the expense of the legislative and judicial
branches. Given that ceding sovereign competences tends to strengthen the
executive anyway, current U.S. constitutional doctrine exacerbates the
problem. Clearly, one obvious solution is to extend less deference to the
executive when sovereign competences are ceded. In Germany, the BVG
willingly confronts the execative. While the executive has been strengthened
by the increasing integration into the EU, the BVG has sought to protect the
powers of the legislature, judiciary, and the states.
VI. CONCLUSION
How willing are courts to address the challenges that delegation of
competences and sharing of competences with supranational and international
entities represent? Based on the judiciary's record when resolving "foreign
affairs" cases, the answer seems clear: not very. The American judiciary has
developed a set of doctrines designed explicitly to avoid reviewing both
domestic laws related to international issues and the acts of foreign states.
Ceding sovereign comptences would seem to fall squarely within the set of
doctrines the judiciary has developed to avoid judicial review. But judicial
review is of paramount importance as the United States cedes sovereign
competences. The process of ceding competences and the existence and acts
of a supranational organization both serve to change the distribution of powers
among the three branches, strengthening the executive at the expense of both
the legislative and judiciary.
The nature of supranational organizations serves to dilute the role the
legislative branch can play if the supranational acts in a way deemed inimical
to American interests. The legislative branch retains only a theoretical power
of withdrawal, a blunt policy instrument unlikely to be invoked in any but the
most severe circumstances. The traditional.role of the executive as negotiator
with foreign states and international organizations is strengthened as the
United States must increasingly rely on informal negotiations with other states
to avoid acceding to the jurisdiction of supranational organizations.
The judiciary can also aggrandize its role, if it chooses. First, the
judiciary can choose to review the procedural and substantive adequacy of
laws implementing treaties that cede sovereign competences. Second, and
more importantly, the judiciary can - and should - play an important role
in monitoring supranational organizations on an ongoing basis to ensure that
the supranational organization is exercising only those powers delegated by the
United States. Accordingly, the judiciary can resist an unwanted accumulation
of power in a supranational organization.
Regardless of how active a role the judiciary plays, however, ceding
sovereign competences effects constructive amendments to our constitutional
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order. No matter what the judiciary does, for example, short of declaring a
delegation unconstitutional, the executive will be strengthened.
As a starting point in reacting to the risks associated with ceding
sovereign competences, the judiciary might adopt the position of the German
Constitutional Court. In its jurisprudence, the BVG has developed a highly
workable approach to German integration in the EU. The BVG accepts that
it has no jurisdiction to interpret the scope of EU powers. The ECJ retains
sole jurisdiction to interpret the Maastricht Treaty. However, the BVG has
held that all delegations of German competences to the EU must be made
through an act of parliament and that it has exclusive jurisdiction to interpret
the acts delegating competences. In other words, the BVG itself defines the
scope of powers delegated to the EU. If the ECJ interprets the powers of the
EU more broadly than the BVG, the BVG holds that such a construction
amounts .to a constructive amendment of the relevant treaties as a matter of
German law and that EU acts based on the competences falling within this
expanded area are not binding on Germany. Further, in order for German
exercise of such powers to be constitutional, the formal treaty making
procedure, including an act of parliament, must be followed. By mandating
this process, the BVG ensures not only its own role as the arbiter of the
constitutionality of German delegations of competences, but also ensures the
participation of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat.
Nonetheless, it should be obvious that this technique of constitutional
interpretation has serious limitations. First and foremost, it may require the
BVG to intervene at a very high level. Given the limited resources of any
court, regular intervention would be impractical, so that the court would have
to restrict itself to "big" questions. Perhaps more problematic, this technique
rests on ex post rejection of EU actions. The court finds itself in the position
of closely monitoring supranational organization. Such a role increases
political pressure on the court and may reduce its effectiveness as a monitor.
Even more difficult in the United States is the lack of a judicial tradition
of declaratory judgments. In Germany, the BVG is normally invoked to
pronounce constitutional judgment on acts to cede sovereign competences
before they take effect, making minor modifications more feasible. The role
of the judiciary in the United States in deciding such issues of constitutional
importance would be greatly enhanced by either declaratory rulings or rulings
soon after the enactment of laws. To realize such a role, consideration should
be given to implementing special procedures, if necessary through
constitutional amendment. However, such a radical change would perhaps be
even more distressing than the changes which are likely to occur absent such
a new judicial role.
The experience of Germany shows that certain constitutional values are
jeopardized more than others when sovereign competences are ceded.
Individual rights can be protected most easily. The structure of a supranational
organization either has the necessary components to protect such rights -
such as an independent judiciary, a delineated Bill of Rights, and doctrines
based on case law - or it does not. The domestic constitutional structure, on
the other hand, is much more difficult to protect. The German experience
illustrates that integration into supranational entities strengthens the executive
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branch at the expense of the legislative, the federal government at the expense
of the states, and supranational dispute resolution structures at the expense of
the domestic judiciary. This result is hardly surprising. The executive plays
the primary role in representing the interests of the domestic state in the
supranational organization. The federal government plays the primary role in
all things "international," including participation in supranational and
international entities. Jurisdiction over particular types of cases shifts from the
domestic judiciary to supranational or international judiciaries. In Germany,
attempts have been made to limit this trend, through both constitutional
amendment and BVG jurisprudence, by requiring direct representation of
individual states in EU institutions. Because it would be impossible to
guarantee such a role in every case, federal officials generally represent
German interests - including competences restricted to the states by the
Grundgesetz - in EU institutions. Currently, the participation of the
legislative and the federal states is restricted almost entirely to the initial
lawmaking process delegating a competence to the EU. The Bundestag and the
Bundesrat play a restricted role. American courts must decide whether such
a role is sufficient.
Similar questions arise concerning the judiciary. The question is not only
whether an Article Ill court plays a role, but whether any American court,
bound by the constitutional protections developed by Article III courts, plays
a role. In the new supranational organizations, American courts play no role
other than potentially deciding whether it is constitutional for the United States
to participate in the organization. American courts must decide whether they
can be excluded entirely (not just whether the role of Article III courts can be
restricted) and whether a restriction of their role to judging the overall
constitutionality of participation is acceptable. It is time for the American
courts to address these questions it has so long sought to avoid.
